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PIRACY AND DUE PROCESS
Andrew Kent*
Introduction
A skiff piloted across the Indian Ocean at night by Somalia pirates mis-
takenly attacked a U.S. naval vessel, and the hapless pirates were soon in 
U.S. government custody.1 Did the Constitution require that they receive 
Miranda warnings before being questioned, or other protections that imple-
ment constitutional due process? Or are constitutional protections inapplica-
ble for some reason—because of the context, territorial location, or non-
U.S. citizenship?
Questions like this arise frequently. In addition to international piracy 
prosecutions, recent cases include Due Process and Fourth Amendment 
claims by the parents of a Mexican teenager killed in Mexico by a U.S. bor-
der patrol agent shooting from the U.S. side of the border;2 a Due Process 
and Fourth Amendment challenge to the drone killing in Yemen of a U.S. 
citizen leader of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula;3 a series of habeas cor-
pus, Due Process, and other challenges to detention, treatment, and military 
commission trials of noncitizens designated as enemy combatants and held 
at the U.S. navy base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba;4 and Fifth Amendment 
challenges to interrogation by U.S. law enforcement officials of foreign na-
tionals held by Kenyan authorities.5
* Professor, Fordham Law School. Thanks to Christopher Borgen, Nathan Chapman, 
Thomas Lee, Ethan Leib, and Peggy McGuinness for helpful comments on earlier versions of 
this article, and to John Langbein and Gregory Durston for expert consultation. This article 
benefitted from presentation at the International Law Colloquium at St. John’s Law School.
1. See United States v. Dire, 680 F.3d 446, 470–75, 473 & n.19 (4th Cir. 2012).
2. Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017).
3. Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 71–74 (D.D.C. 2014).
4. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (evaluating a habeas Suspen-
sion Clause challenge to a statute stripping jurisdiction over habeas claims); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (analyzing statutory and separation of powers challenges to 
military commission); Al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (evaluating an 
Ex Post Facto Clause challenge to military commission); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) (analyzing a damages suit against the Secretary of Defense and others concerning 
military detention and alleged mistreatment).
5. In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 103–05, 108, 
115 (2d Cir. 2008). For other examples, see Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (examining habeas challenges to detention of noncitizen enemy combatants by the U.S. 
military at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan); El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 
F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (evaluating a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim by a Suda-
nese corporation hit by a cruise missile fired in retaliation for Al Qaeda’s bombing of U.S. 
embassies in Africa).
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Extraterritorial U.S. government action tends to involve national securi-
ty and foreign affairs considerations and often is directed at non-U.S. per-
sons. These cases thus raise sensitive issues about both the legal limits on 
the national security and foreign affairs powers of the U.S. government and 
the role of the judiciary versus the political branches in articulating and en-
forcing those limits. The cases also raise the question of whether U.S. citi-
zenship, or lack of it, should be a primary consideration in defining the lim-
its of U.S. government power when deployed abroad.6
Since the mid-twentieth century, U.S. Supreme Court case law and 
government practice have coalesced around the view that U.S. citizens carry 
their constitutional rights with them globally.7 But with regard to nonciti-
zens, the law and practice are very different. The Supreme Court did not 
start opining on this issue until the latter part of the nineteenth century, but 
once it did, the Court repeatedly stated that noncitizens abroad were outside 
the protection of the Constitution.8
Before the late nineteenth century, direct statements about whether non-
U.S. citizens possessed constitutional rights extraterritorially were few. Still, 
they pointed the same way—against extraterritorial rights for noncitizens.9
But the lack of evidence of direct discussions of the issue during the Found-
ing and antebellum periods, combined with the fact that most rights-bearing 
provisions of the Constitution are, by their text, not limited to citizens,10 led 
some judges, scholars, and litigants to make originalist arguments in favor 
of viewing constitutional rights as operative abroad to protect noncitizens. 
Thus Louis Henkin, the leading foreign relations scholar of the second half 
6. Some other countries’ legal systems are confronting the same type of questions. See
Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 55, 81–108 (2011) (docu-
menting debates about legal extraterritoriality in Canada and the United Kingdom).
7. See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? 25 (2009); J. 
Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 
463, 474–75, 478 & n.86 (2007) [hereinafter Kent, Global Constitution]; Andrew Kent, Citi-
zenship and Protection, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2115, 2120–21 (2014) [hereinafter Kent, Citi-
zenship].
8. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268–75 (1990); John-
son v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 771, 784 (1950); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 
332 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); United 
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 694 (1898); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
U.S. 698, 724 (1893).
9. See, e.g., Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385, 399 (1863); 33 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 693, 1042 (1819) (providing statements of Rep. Henry Baldwin and Rep. Alexander 
Smyth); REPORT OF VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES REGARDING THE ALIEN AND SEDITION 
ACTS (1800), reprinted in 17 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 303, 320–21 (David. B. Mat-
tern et al. eds., 1991). On the meaning of this Virginia report, authored by James Madison, see 
Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 530–31. During the late 1790s, a time of conflict 
with France, there were frequent statements by Federalists that no noncitizen, whether in the 
United States or abroad, possessed constitutional rights. See id. at 529–30 (collecting sources).
10. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people . . . .”); id. amend. V 
(“No person shall be held . . . .”); id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions . . . .”).
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of the twentieth century, asserted that the Founders intended the Bill of 
Rights to be a “universal human rights ideology.”11 Henkin’s view was ac-
cepted by some other scholars and by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.12
But these kinds of originalist arguments fail to persuade most scholars 
and judges. When the Court in Boumediene v. Bush extended the Constitu-
tion to noncitizens at a U.S. military base in foreign territory—protecting 
noncitizens outside the United States for the first time—it did not rely on 
originalist arguments, finding them inconclusive.13 Likewise, scholarship 
has rebutted originalist arguments in favor of extraterritorial constitutional 
rights for noncitizens. As I explained elsewhere, the best textual and 
originalist reading of the Constitution is that relations with foreign nations 
and noncitizens abroad would be conducted pursuant to international law, 
sub-constitutional domestic law (e.g., statutes and common law), and di-
plomacy, rather than via extraterritorial application of the Constitution.14
A new article, Due Process Abroad by Professor Nathan Chapman,15
seeks to defend an originalist view of a global Constitution for noncitizens 
through a focus on the law governing English and then early American re-
sponses to piracy. Chapman’s vision of global due process for all has both 
great territorial reach and great power. First, he claims that the Due Process 
Clause was intended and understood by the founding generation to be glob-
al, benefitting both citizens and noncitizens “anywhere in the world.”16 Due 
process, according to Chapman, meant that, outside of the context of “war,”
the U.S. government could not deprive any person, anywhere, of life, liber-
ty, or property except according to standing law, including the Constitution, 
11. LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 99–
100 (1990); see also Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individ-
ual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 32 (1985).
12. See United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 701–02 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing); DKT Mem’l Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 307–08 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Jordan J. Paust, Boumediene and 
Fundamental Principles of Constitutional Power, 21 REGENT U. L. REV. 351, 354–55 (2009); 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of a Comparative Perspective 
in Constitutional Adjudication, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 8 (2003); Jules Lobel, The Constitution 
Abroad, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 871, 875–76 (1989).
Other scholars have made more specific claims, for instance that the habeas corpus right 
embodied in the Constitution’s Suspension Clause was originally understood to protect 
noncitizens abroad. See Brief for Professors of Constitutional Law and Federal Jurisdiction as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 5–25, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (No. 
06-1195).
13. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746.
14. Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7; Andrew Kent, Disappearing Legal Black 
Holes and Converging Domains: Changing Individual Rights Protection in National Security 
and Foreign Affairs, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1036–37 (2015) [hereinafter Kent, Black 
Holes].
15. Nathan S. Chapman, Due Process Abroad, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 377 (2017).
16. Id. at 377.
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its jury rights, and other applicable law.17 Although Chapman never makes 
clear how to distinguish “war” from other uses of force, he maintains that 
there was such a well-understood line in English and early American law. 
Where due process applied, Chapman asserts that use of the jury was “the 
sine qua non of traditional due process.”18
Second, Chapman appears to claim that this global Due Process Clause 
was understood to be a substantive limit on the way the U.S. government 
could respond to perceived threats. According to Chapman, anyone, any-
where who was “suspected” of engaging in conduct which violated U.S. 
civil or criminal laws could “only” be proceeded against by the U.S. gov-
ernment via judicial due process.19 Since U.S. statutes have always criminal-
ized violent group-based misconduct that might in theory demand a military 
response—for instance, treason and piracy since 1790, international slave 
trading since 1808, and, today, the use of a weapon of mass destruction and 
provision of material support to terrorist organizations20—Chapman’s ver-
sion of global due process would severely restrict the range of policy re-
sponses that the U.S. government could pursue.21
17. Id. at 377, 381.
18. Id. at 381.
19. Id. (“To comply with due process, the federal government could deprive someone 
of rights only in compliance with the Constitution, statutes, treaties, court procedures, and 
general law, including the common law and the law of nations.”); id. at 389 (“[T]he historical 
evidence strongly suggests that Americans understood all those suspected of violating U.S. 
law—anywhere—to be entitled to due process of law before the government could deprive 
them of ‘life, liberty, or property.’”); id. at 405 (“Due process required the ordinary constitu-
tional, statutory, and common law criminal procedures before the punishment of any suspect 
captured outside U.S. territory.”).
20. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 1, 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14 (treason and pira-
cy); Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426 (international slave trade); 18 U.S.C. § 2332a 
(2012) (use of weapon of mass destruction); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012) (material 
support to terrorist organizations).
21. But in post-publication communications with me, Chapman describes his article as 
claiming, instead, that the government did have the option of pursuing militarily as enemies, 
without due process, persons who engaged in conduct contrary to domestic law, rather than 
always treating them as suspected criminals with due process. In this version, due process 
does not limit the choice of means by the government, but merely requires that, once the 
means of law enforcement have been chosen, due process procedures are mandatory, even if 
the government is acting abroad against noncitizens. By the seventeenth century in England, 
as also in colonial and early American law, due process required the use of the traditionally-
applicable common law procedures such as the jury in a legal proceeding at which life, liber-
ty, or property were at issue, held in a properly constituted tribunal, and charging a violation 
of a known offense. See J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 97–98, 
472–73 (4th ed. 2002); JULIUS GOEBEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT 
IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1664–1776, at 385 (1970); 
Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 
YALE L.J. 1672, 1679 (2012). Under this definition, little if any government conduct implicat-
ing due process would actually take place against pirates abroad or on the high seas; the rele-
vant state action would occur rather in English or American territory, once the suspected pi-
rate, apprehended extraterritorially, was brought there and proceeded against judicially. 
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Chapman grounds his claims about the U.S. Constitution in an extended 
discussion of English law, which concludes that England also viewed due 
process as global and as imposing a substantive restraint in favor of a crimi-
nal justice approach to piracy suppression starting in the sixteenth century.
Due Process Abroad, and its originalist view of global constitutional-
ism, is already receiving favorable attention from some legal scholars22 and 
litigants.23 Many legal scholars have long had sympathy for arguments in 
favor of constitutional rights extending globally to noncitizens,24 even as 
originalist arguments to that effect have seemed weakly-sourced. A critical 
examination of the evidence presented in his new article would seem useful 
at this time. Perhaps the recent academic coalescence around the view that 
the Constitution was not understood to provide extraterritorial protections 
during the founding era and early Republic, at least with regard to nonciti-
zens,25 needs to be re-examined.
A focus on piracy is both apt and timely. Piracy took place primarily on 
the high seas, therefore inherently raising questions about extraterritorial 
application of fundamental rights. Citizens and subjects of many nations en-
gaged in piracy, and frequently intermingled as crew, thus raising questions 
Chapman seems to concede this. See, e.g., Chapman, supra note 15, at 382 (“Federal officers 
who captured suspects on the high seas, in foreign territorial waters, and even on foreign soil 
transported them back to the United States, where those suspects received the same due pro-
cess protections as any other federal defendant.”); id. at 382–83 (stating that a federal official 
who punished a suspected pirate extrajudicially on the high seas would be “personally liable 
in a damages action for marine trespass”—not, apparently, found to have violated the Due 
Process Clause). Yet it is entirely uncontroversial that persons charged with domestic crimes 
and tried in England or America were entitled to due process there, no matter their citizenship 
or where apprehended. See, e.g., Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 505, 516, 518–
21; Kent, Citizenship, supra note 7, at 2118–19. So, if this is all Chapman is saying, one won-
ders why this uncontroversial thesis would be presented as “challeng[ing]” a supposedly con-
trary “consensus.” Chapman, supra note 15, at 377. It certainly feels odd to disagree with an 
author about what his paper says, but still I choose to address the bolder, substantive reading 
of Due Process Abroad, outlined in my main text above, rather than the minimal and uncon-
troversial thesis described in this footnote because I find the former more faithful to his writ-
ten text.
22. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Scholars in Support of Re-
spondents at 7, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965); Ilya Somin, Does The 
Constitution Require Due Process Abroad?, JOTWELL (July 12, 2017), https://
conlaw.jotwell.com/does-the-constitution-require-due-process-abroad/ (last visited Oct. 4, 
2018).
23. Reply Brief of FBME Bank Ltd. and FBME Ltd. at 17, FBME Ltd. v. Mnuchin, 
709 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 17-5076), 2017 WL 3215091, at *17 (citing the article 
favorably).
24. See Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 469.
25. See, e.g., RAUSTIALA, supra note 7, at 38; GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO 
THE CONSTITUTION 7 (1996); Kent, Black Holes, supra note 14, at 1036–39; see also Chap-
man, supra note 15, at 380 (“[S]cholars seem to uniformly agree that early American history 
supports the notion that due process stopped—especially for aliens—at the nation’s bor-
ders.”). See generally Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7.
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about the extent to which legal protection turned on nationality. And piracy 
was a phenomenon that blurred lines between war and crime, leading gov-
ernment piracy suppression operations to contain elements of both war 
fighting and law enforcement. It is thus an important test case for Founding 
era views about the reach of fundamental constitutional rights to places, per-
sons, and contexts beyond the paradigm case of the Constitution’s applica-
bility—governance of U.S. citizens in the United States.
The study of piracy and piracy suppression in this article and Chap-
man’s is part of a growing body of work on those subjects by legal scholars 
and historians. Recent historical work elevated piracy and piracy suppres-
sion to important places in debates about the drivers of central state for-
mation in Europe,26 the motives for English colonization of the new world,27
the aims of European great power politics during the early modern era,28 and 
the legal delimitation of the oceans.29 Legal scholars focused on the role of 
piracy in the development of concepts of international torts and crimes,30
international jurisdiction including universal jurisdiction,31 and the interna-
tional law cases of the U.S. federal courts sitting in their admiralty and 
maritime jurisdiction.32 With the re-emergence of piracy as a live threat, es-
pecially off the east coast of Africa and in the waters around Indonesia and 
26. See, e.g., MIKKEL THORUP, AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF TERROR: WAR,
VIOLENCE, AND THE STATE (2010); JANICE E. THOMSON, MERCENARIES, PIRATES, AND 
SOVEREIGNS: STATE-BUILDING AND EXTRATERRITORIAL VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN 
EUROPE (1994).
27. See MARK G. HANNA, PIRATE NESTS AND THE RISE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 1570–
1740 (2015).
28. See, e.g., CARL BRIDENBAUGH & ROBERTA BRIDENBAUGH, NO PEACE BEYOND 
THE LINE: THE ENGLISH IN THE CARIBBEAN 1624–1690 (1972).
29. See, e.g., Lauren Benton, Legal Spaces of Empire: Piracy and the Origins of Ocean 
Regionalism, 47 COMP. STUD. SOC. & HIST. 700 (2005).
30. See, e.g., Yvonne M. Dutton, Bringing Pirates to Justice: A Case for Including Pi-
racy Within the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 11 CHI. J. INT’L L. 197, 198 
(2010); Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals 
About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111 (2004).
31. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction and Its Place 
in International Law, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE 
PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 39, 47–49 (Stephen Mace-
do ed., 2004); Joseph M. Isanga, Countering Persistent Contemporary Sea Piracy: Expanding 
Jurisdictional Regimes, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1267 (2010); Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy 
Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hollow Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 184 
(2004) [hereinafter Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy].
32. See, e.g., Joel H. Samuels, How Piracy Has Shaped the Relationship Between 
American Law and International Law, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 1231 (2010); William R. Casto, The
Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers, and Pirates, 37 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117 (1993); G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International 
Law: The Piracy Cases, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 727 (1989).
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Malaysia,33 legal scholarship has also focused on modern rules and institu-
tions of domestic and international law of piracy suppression.34
This article explores in depth the law of nations, English domestic law, 
and English government practice from the late medieval period through the 
eighteenth century, and the U.S. constitutional law and government practice 
during the Founding and antebellum periods. I conclude that Chapman’s
claims about due process and piracy suppression are incorrect. Both Parlia-
ment and the U.S. Congress; both the Crown and its counselors and U.S 
Presidents and their advisers; both the Royal Navy and the U.S. Navy; and 
commentators both English and American believed that (1) pirates on the 
high seas could lawfully be subject to extrajudicial killing, but that (2) the 
criminal justice system was usually the preferred approach to dealing with 
pirates, and when tried for their crimes in English or American territory re-
spectively, accused pirates were entitled to due process of law.
This article proceeds in five main parts. Section II discusses the law and 
government practice of England from the 1500s to 1800. Theorists of the 
emerging law of nations taught that pirates were unprotected by the law and 
could be slaughtered wherever found. English domestic law adopted this 
view, and the Royal Navy and colonial forces carried it out. This section 
disputes Chapman’s reading of two anti-piracy statutes from the time of 
Henry VIII, showing that they did not instantiate a global vision of due pro-
cess. It also questions Chapman’s claim that a statute from William III’s
reign that allowed jury-less criminal trials of pirates was viewed as prob-
lematic or illegal. Section III explains why, despite the lawfulness of mili-
tary force against pirates, under the law of nations and domestic law, the 
English government nevertheless preferred a law enforcement approach to 
piracy. Section IV turns to the post-independence law of the United States. 
It continued the English tradition, under which law enforcement was the 
first option, but military force was viewed as a lawful tool as well. The final 
part, Section V, addresses the problem of drawing lines between contexts in 
which only law enforcement methods may be used and those in which mili-
tary force is also lawful. A brief Conclusion offers some thoughts about the 
persistence of originalist arguments for a global Constitution, despite the 
lack of evidence to support them.
33. IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS., https://www.icc-
ccs.org/index.php/piracy-reporting-centre (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
34. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, “A Guantánamo on the Sea”: The Difficulty of 
Prosecuting Pirates and Terrorists, 98 CAL. L. REV. 243 (2010); James Kraska & Brian Wil-
son, The Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The Coalition Is the Strategy, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 243 
(2009); Michael Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and Strategic Theory 
for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1 (2007).
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I.  The Law of England
English law and practice are crucial to Due Process Abroad because the 
article claims that the new United States embodied in its Constitution a due 
process framework inherited from its mother country. Anglo-American fun-
damental law, according to Chapman, prohibited the government from using 
any means other than law enforcement and due process to confront any per-
son, anywhere, whose conduct violated, or was suspected of violating, a 
criminal statute. The strong weight of the evidence refutes these claims.
Due Process Abroad presents a truncated version of the history of crim-
inal process in England. According to Chapman, English fundamental law 
dating back to the medieval period required that no free person could be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property except according to the ordinary course of 
the common law.35 He notes that common lawyers identified this principle 
with the “law of the land” clause of Magna Carta (1215) and the “due pro-
cess” requirements of statutes dating from the fourteenth-century reign of 
King Edward III.36 According to Chapman, “the sine qua non of traditional 
due process” was trial by jury.37 He asserts that this understanding of due 
process “set sail”—i.e., came to cover all persons within its ambit of protec-
tion, even pirates found on the high seas—in two landmark statutes of Hen-
ry VIII (1535 and 1536).38 These acts ordained that piracies and other 
crimes committed on the high seas should be tried according to the common 
law, with grand jury indictment and jury trial. Due Process Abroad reads 
them to be examples of a more general principle that the government was 
limited to common law procedures whenever it confronted any person, an-
ywhere, who was suspected of engaging in conduct made civilly or crimi-
nally wrongful by statute or common law. The article portrays as an unfor-
tunate deviation—which was reviled and quickly corrected by Americans 
after their revolution—a statute, enacted at the end of the seventeenth centu-
ry during the reign of William III, which authorized trial of pirates captured 
on the high seas or in the English colonies in ad hoc admiralty courts sitting 
without a jury.
There are many problems with this account, both in its particulars and 
in its conclusion. First, the particulars: In the time before the American 
Revolution, English law never required that life, liberty, and property only 
be taken away through common law procedures. There were always courts 
that heard criminal cases under non-common law procedures, though these 
generally did not impose the death penalty. It did come to be considered an 
important part of traditional English liberty that capital cases—and piracy 
was a capital crime—be heard only according to common law procedure. 
But this was not the motivation for the statutes of Henry VIII. Those statutes 
35. See Chapman, supra note 15, at 381, 393–94.
36. See id. at 393–94.
37. Id. at 381.
38. Id. at 392–94.
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were expressly intended to make it easier to convict and hang pirates. As for 
the statute of William III, Due Process Abroad assumes that it must have 
been widely seen as unlawful, but presents no evidence of this.
And, on the overall conclusion, it is clear that English law and policy 
approved the extrajudicial killing of pirates encountered on the high seas. 
There was no global due process for pirates. This English view emerged out 
of many intellectual sources, including writings on the law of nature and the 
law of nations. It was also driven by the practical reason that the oceans 
were vast, transport and communications slow, and the protective resources 
of the state minimal—meaning that self-help and summary violence were 
perceived to be necessary tools.
A. The Legal Status of Pirates under the Emerging Law of Nations
By the seventeenth century, a consensus emerged among jurists and 
theorists of the law of nations that pirates were outside the protection of the 
law and could be lawfully killed by anyone, whether government or private 
actors.
Several centuries earlier, up through the early Renaissance period, pira-
cy was not a legal term, and acts of piracy were not seen as necessarily ille-
gal on the international plane.39 Individual polities applied their domestic 
law to combat robberies and violence at sea. For instance, starting in the late 
1200s, surviving records show English civil court proceedings seeking 
compensation for acts of robbing and pillaging at sea.40 Starting in the mid-
1300s, there are records of English common law criminal proceedings for 
acts that would later be called piracy.41 In the same period, diplomatic rec-
ords show the English crown negotiating to pay compensation to foreign 
merchants who had been victimized by English sea raiders.42
Emerging out of both Christian scholastic and humanistic intellectual 
traditions during the Renaissance, writers in the 1500s began developing 
theories of lawful international behavior that eventually became a largely
secular “law of nations”—what would later be called international law. 
These early theorists almost uniformly condemned piracy as illegal, viewed 
the lives and property of pirates as unprotected by law, and authorized the 
use of unrestrained violence against them. Pierino Belli (1502–75), a mili-
tary commander and then councilor of state for the Duke of Savoy, wrote of 
pirates in his treatise De Re Militari et Bello Tractatus that “it should be 
permissible for anyone to attack them . . . even persons in private life may 
39. See THOMAS K. HEEBØLL-HOLM, PORTS, PIRACY AND MARITIME WAR: PIRACY IN 
THE ENGLISH CHANNEL AND THE ATLANTIC, C. 1280–C. 1330, at 13 (John Hudson ed., 2013).
40. See Reginald G. Marsden, Introduction to 1 SELECT PLEAS IN THE COURT OF 
ADMIRALTY, at xi, xvii–xxxiv (Reginald G. Marsden ed., 1894).
41. GREGORY DURSTON, THE ADMIRALTY SESSIONS, 1536–1834: MARITIME CRIME 
AND THE SILVER OAR 4 (2017).
42. Id.; Marsden, supra note 40, at xvii–xxxv.
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assault such outlaws—and to the point of killing them.”43 Balthazar Ayala 
(1548–84), an influential jurist from the Spanish Netherlands, taught that 
pirates cannot receive any protection from the laws of war.44 Jean Bodin 
(1530–96), an important French law professor, politician, and political theo-
rist, taught that pirates and brigands were not “just and lawful enemies” and 
so are “excluded from all the benefit of the law of Armes.”45
One of the most influential figures in conceptualizing a secular law of 
nations and defining rules regarding piracy s Alberico Gentili (1552–1608), 
a Protestant refugee from an Italian state who settled in England and served 
more than two decades as the Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford Uni-
versity. Gentili wrote that the law of nations and its subpart, the laws of war, 
apply to conflicts between organized sovereign states, but not to conflicts 
with or between private individuals or groups.46 By definition, a lawful 
“state of war cannot exist with pirates and robbers.”47 “Neither brigands not 
pirates are entitled to the privileges of international law, since they them-
selves have utterly spurned all intercourse with their fellowmen and, so far 
as in them lies, endeavor to drag the world back to the savagery of primitive 
times.”48 “With pirates and brigands, who violate all laws, no laws remain in 
force.”49 “[N]o rights will be due to these men who have broken all human 
and divine laws . . . .”50
According to Gentili, the lack of any protection of the law for pirates 
meant that unlimited violence could lawfully be used to suppress them. In 
general, private war—organized violence not carried on by a sovereign 
state—was illegal and could “be punished with death[.]”51 This was even
more so with pirates. Quoting Cicero, Gentili referred to pirates as “the 
common enemies of all mankind . . . .”52 “It is right to make war upon pi-
rates . . . .”53 Gentili then states that all nations may participate in “the slay-
ing of pirates[,]” for they are “common enemies, and they are attacked with 
43. PIERINO BELLI, DE RE MILITARI ET BELLO TRACTATUS (1563), quoted in Harry D. 
Gould, Cicero’s Ghost: Rethinking the Social Construction of Piracy, in MARITIME PIRACY 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 23, 30 (Michael J. Struett et al. eds., 
2012).
44. Id. at 31.
45. JEAN BODIN, THE SIX BOOKES OF A COMMONWEALE 1 (Kenneth Douglas McRae 
ed., Richard Knolles trans., 1962) (1606).
46. See 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TRES 15, 20, 25 (John C. Rolfe 
trans., 1933) (1612) [hereinafter GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI]; see id.
47. Id. at 22.
48. ALBERICO GENTILI, DE LEGATIONIBUS LIBRI TRES 79 (Gordon J. Laing trans., 
photo. reprint 1924) (1594).
49. GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 46, at 24.
50. Id. at 124.
51. Id. at 20 (quoting Plato).
52. Id. at 22.
53. Id. at 124.
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impunity by all, because they are without the pale of the law.”54 “They 
ought to be crushed[,]” and states should “everywhere . . . shatter the lairs of 
pirates.”55 Gentili even compared pirates to dangerous beasts: “To pirates 
and wild beasts no territory offer safety. Pirates are the enemies of all men 
and are attacked by all men with impunity, etc. Similarly the hunting of wild 
beasts is unrestricted.”56 In sum, pirates may be “put to death . . . .”57
Along with Gentili, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) is rec-
ognized as the other major founder of international law. Grotius used the 
concept of the state of nature and an analogy between individuals and states 
to inform his work on standards of international behavior. Individuals in the 
state of nature, prior to government and thus prior to any sovereign-created 
law, had certain rights and duties to each other according to the law of na-
ture. These core rights included self-defense and the right to punish wrong-
doers with violence. Just as man had a natural right to kill “a Serpent,”
“Foxes; and noxious Reptiles,” and other “Beasts . . . [which] do, or attempt 
to do, us hurt,” so also could he kill “a Robber, or a Thief,” or other “Male-
factor.”58 Grotius—and later, John Locke—taught that, when humans en-
tered into social relations and created governments, the natural right of self-
defense and punishment was partially transferred to the sovereign.59 But on 
the international plane, there was no sovereign who stood above states. Gro-
tius therefore theorized states to stand in relation to each other as did indi-
viduals in the state of nature: possessed of no common sovereign, and ac-
cordingly allowed to deploy their natural right to use lethal force in self-
defense.60
According to Grotius, sovereigns possessed the right to use violence to 
protect and prevent injuries to their subjects and polities and also to punish 
persons, groups, or states which did not directly injure them but committed 
“grievous Violations of the Law of Nature of Nations,” including cannibals 
and “those who practice piracy” and therefore are “cut . . . off from human 
Society.”61 Thus, any sovereign could lawfully make war against pirates 
(and, as noted, private individuals could use violent self-help against pirates 
54. Id. at 423.
55. Id. at 423–24.
56. 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, HISPANICAE ADVOCATIONIS LIBRI DUO 18 (Frank Frost Ab-
bott trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1921) (1613).
57. GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI, supra note 46, at 22.
58. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 973–74 (Richard Tuck ed., 
Jean Barbeyrac trans., Liberty Fund 2005) (1625).
59. Id. at 1021–24; see also RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 81–82
(1999) (discussing the parallel development of this concept in the thought of Grotius and 
Locke).
60. See TUCK, supra note 59, at 8–9, 95–96, 129, 140, 186, 188; J. Andrew Kent, Con-
gress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations,
85 TEX. L. REV. 843, 887–88 (2007).
61. GROTIUS, supra note 58, at 1021–24.
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on the high seas). “[T]he justest War is that which is undertaken against 
wild rapacious Beasts, and next to it is that against Men who are like 
Beasts.”62 On the high seas, where no sovereign ruled, private persons, as 
well as governments, continued to have a natural right to use violent self-
help against those who would injure them.63 Thus private individuals could 
also lawfully slay pirates.
The core teachings of Gentili, Grotius, and others on the right to destroy 
pirates were carried forward through the centuries. This idea was often en-
capsulated in the Ciceronian phrase hostis humani generis—that pirates 
were the common enemies of all mankind.64 This concept had a secondary 
meaning as well, applicable in domestic judicial systems. One example is in 
the work of the famed English jurist Edward Coke (1552–1634), who served 
as Solicitor General of England, Attorney General of England, Chief Justice 
of the Common Pleas, and then Chief Justice of the King’s Bench. When 
Coke discussed pirates’ status as “hostis humani generis,”65 he meant the 
war against all nations and laws waged by pirates, and their locus on the 
high seas where all nations had a common right of self-defense, allowed any 
state to exercise jurisdiction to punish a captured pirate in its domestic legal 
system, no matter the nationality of the offender or the nationality of the 
victims.66
These two related meanings of hostis humani generis were accepted by 
English legal authorities. By the seventeenth century, writers on internation-
al law agreed that “pirates were considered to be an evil to be eradicated.”67
For instance, Richard Zouche (1590–1661), who, like Gentili, held the Re-
gius chair in Civil Law at Oxford, and also served as judge of England’s
High Court of Admiralty, wrote in a 1650 treatise that “the laws of war do 
not apply” to “pirates” and “brigands,” and so it is “lawful to offend and de-
stroy [them] utterly.”68 Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Attorney General and 
62. Id. at 1024.
63. Id. at 970 (“Yet the ancient Liberty, which the Law of Nature at first gave us, re-
mains still in Force where there are no Courts of Justice, as upon the Sea.”).
64. This term was first used by Roman authors to describe tyrants like Nero and Com-
modus, and later during the Dark Ages by Christian theologians to describe the devil. See
DAN EDELSTEIN, THE TERROR OF NATURAL RIGHT: REPUBLICANISM, THE CULT OF NATURE,
AND THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 30–34 (2009).
65. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
113 (London, M. Flesher 1644).
66. See Eugene Kontorovich, The “Define and Punish” Clause and the Limits of Uni-
versal Jurisdiction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 149, 165–66 (2009); Kontorovich, The Piracy Analo-
gy, supra note 31, at 190–92.
67. HEEBØLL-HOLM, supra note 39, at 13. See also Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy,
supra note 31, at 190 (“The law of nations also permitted any nation that caught a pirate to 
summarily execute him at sea.”).
68. 2 RICHARD ZOUCHE, AN EXPOSITION OF FECIAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, OR OF 
LAW BETWEEN NATIONS, AND QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SAME 37–38 (Thomas Erskine 
Holland ed., J.L. Brierly trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1911) (1650).
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Lord High Chancellor of England under James I, wrote that “[i]t was never 
doubted but a war upon pirates may be lawfully made by any nation, though 
not infested or violated by them[,]” because “pirates are communes humani 
generis hostes[.]”69 Bacon also approved of preventive war against any 
states that engaged in piracy: “Beasts are not less savage because they have 
dens.”70
Charles Molloy (1640–1690), a barrister whose popular treatise on in-
ternational maritime law went through at least ten editions, summed up the 
conventional wisdom of centuries of writers on the law of nations by hold-
ing that “[a]gainst Pirates and such as live by Robbery at Sea, any Prince 
hath power to make War,”71 in other words, to use military force. Molloy 
continued that anyone who captures pirates on the ocean, including private 
persons, “may execute such Beasts of Prey immediately, without any So-
lemnity of Condemnation.”72 And according to Molloy, if captors did bring 
pirates to port to stand trial, but “the Judge openly rejects the Tryal, or the 
Captors cannot wait for the Judge without certain peril and loss,” the pirates 
may, by the “Law of Nature,” be “executed by the Captors.”73
Matthew Tindal (1657–1733), a philosopher and influential Admiralty 
lawyer, agreed with the consensus that pirates and others who engage in 
private, non-state sanctioned violence have “no Right by the Law of Nations 
to be treated as [a lawful] Enemy,” but rather may be “put[ ]. . . to Death.”74
In the eighteenth century, William Blackstone (1723–80), member of 
Parliament and then Justice of King’s Bench and Common Pleas, summa-
rized in his magisterial treatise the view of pirates taken by natural law and 
law of nations theorists. He wrote that pirates have reduced themselves “to 
the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind,” and so “all 
mankind must declare war against him: so that every community hath a 
right, by the rule of self-defence, to inflict that punishment upon him, which 
every individual would in a state of nature have been otherwise entitled to 
do.”75 As discussed above, in the state of nature, the putative state of hu-
mankind prior to social organization and government, people were said to 
have a natural liberty to use lethal force in self-defense and as a deterrent to 
69. FRANCIS BACON, ADVERTISEMENT TOUCHING A HOLY WAR (1622), reprinted in 1
THE WORKS OF LORD BACON 521, 528 (London, Henry G. Bohn 1854).
70. Id.
71. CHARLES MOLLOY, DE JURE MARITIMO ET NAVALI: OR, A TREATISE OF AFFAIRES 
MARITIME, AND OF COMMERCE 55 (7th ed., London, John Walthoe, Jr., 1722).
72. Id. at 61.
73. Id.
74. MAT[THEW] TINDALL, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE LAWS OF NATIONS AND THE 
RIGHTS OF SOVEREIGNS 20, 24–25 (London, Richard Baldwin, 1694).
75. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *71.
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others.76 John Locke, in expounding the right of every person in the state of 
nature “to kill a murderer,” taught that those who “hath, by unjust violence 
and slaughter . . . declared war against all mankind, [may] therefore be de-
stroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild beasts.”77 Since international 
relations between states, and relations between individuals on the high seas, 
were also said to occur in a state of nature, Blackstone was referencing the 
well-established view that governments and private individuals could law-
fully kill pirates, the enemies of all mankind, and outside the protection of 
the law.
B. English Domestic Law on Piracy
Although the law of nations was quite clear that pirates could be target-
ed with military force or summarily executed upon capture, English domes-
tic law, in theory, might have limited or abolished that rule with respect to 
the conduct of the English government and private English actors. In other 
words, domestic law might have provided pirates with an entitlement to be 
treated as an accused criminal subject to due process rather than an unlawful 
combatant or wild beast subject to summary violence. This, in effect, is 
Chapman’s argument, though he ignores the voluminous evidence (summa-
rized above) about the legality of summary violence against pirates under 
the law of nations.78
Chapman reads a passage in Blackstone to state that suspected pirates 
had the right to be proceeded against only by due process and the law of the 
land, no matter their nationality and no matter where they were seized. Here 
is the relevant passage in Blackstone:
Formerly [piracy] was only cognizable by the admiralty courts, 
which proceed by the rules of the civil law. But it being incon-
sistent with the liberties of the nation that any man’s life should be 
taken away, unless by the judgment of his peers or the common law 
of the land, the statute 28 Hen. 8 c. 15 established a new jurisdic-
tion for this purpose, which proceeds according to the course of the 
common law . . . .79
76. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 6–11 (C.B. Mac-
pherson ed., Hackett Publ’g 1980) (1690); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 183–91 (C.B. Mac-
pherson ed., Penguin Books 1985) (1651).
77. LOCKE, supra note 76, § 11.
78. Chapman does not discuss the work of Grotius, Gentili, Zouche, Molloy, or other 
influential theorists who wrote that pirates are unprotected by the law of nations and could 
lawfully be killed.
79. Chapman, supra note 15, at 394 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 75).
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According to Chapman, Blackstone meant that “the Acts of 1535 and 
1536 effectively extended Magna Carta’s ‘law of the land’ protection to 
those accused of crimes on the high seas. Due process had set sail.”80
It is uncontroversial that pirates present in England and charged with a 
domestic law crime would be entitled to protection of the courts and law, 
including due process of law. But, as noted above, Chapman appears to be 
making two stronger claims. First, he asserts that due process always re-
quired full common law procedural protections, including the jury. Second, 
he views the English anti-piracy statutes as evidencing a supposed rule that 
the government could not address suspected piracy—even on the high seas 
and when committed by non-Englishmen—with anything other than law en-
forcement methods following all of the usual procedural protections of the 
common law. The evidence for these claims is lacking. My discussion is di-
vided into two subparts. First, I show that the two statutes from Henry 
VIII’s time had a very different purpose and meaning than what Chapman 
claims. Second, I show that “due process” in English law was never under-
stood to require that all criminal proceedings proceed under full common 
law procedures.
1. Understanding the Statutes of 1535 and 1536
Two anti-piracy statutes enacted by Henry VIII and Parliament in 1535 
and 1536 did not extend “due process abroad” to pirates—or anyone else—
on the high seas or in foreign lands. The statutes were enacted to strip away 
procedural protections that had made it too difficult to convict pirates and 
other malefactors. There is no evidence that they were intended or under-
stood to grant global due process to suspected pirates.
Before the two Henrican statutes, English admiralty courts trying pira-
cies proceeded according to the course of the civil law, using a Roman-
canon law criminal procedure in which judges served as fact-finders.81 The 
civil law character of these proceedings, with judges serving in inquisitorial 
and fact-finding roles, in addition to determining the law, can be seen on the 
face of commissions issued concerning piracy. For example, a 1531 com-
mission from Henry VIII appointed Arthur Viscount Lisle, the vice-admiral 
of England, and several other men, including a civilian (“John Fewter, 
LL.D.”) “as justices to make inquisitions concerning pirates and piracies, 
and to hear and determine all such cases.”82
80. Id. at 393–94.
81. DURSTON, supra note 41, at 8; 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 546, 550 (3d ed. 1922). This dated at least from Edward III’s Statute of Treasons. See
BLACKSTONE, supra note 75. On the earlier history of criminal trials for piracy in England, 
see DURSTON, supra note 41, at 7–8; Marsden, supra note 40, at xxxvi.
82. 5 LETTERS AND PAPERS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, OF THE REIGN OF HENRY VIII
14 (James Gairdner ed., London, HM’s Stationery Office 1885) (entry 35). A “civilian” is a 
lawyer trained in the civil law. On the training and practice of English civilians, see Charles S. 
Cumming, The English High Court of Admiralty, 17 TUL. MARITIME L.J. 209, 226–29 (1993).
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The preambles to the statutes of 1535 and 1536 state that pirates, rob-
bers, murderers, and others who committed crimes upon the high seas 
“many tymes escape unpunysshed [unpunished]” because the proceedings 
occurred under the civil law, which requires before the judgment of death be 
imposed that “either they [the accused] must playnly confess their offences 
(which they will never doo without torture or paynes),” or there must be tes-
timony from indifferent witnesses who saw the offence committed, which is 
very difficult to acquire because the crimes occur on the seas and perpetra-
tors “many tymes murder or kill” any possible witnesses.83
The problem was that the civil law had very high standards of proof 
compared to the common law, as the statutes recite. An English common 
law jury could “convict on whatever evidence persuaded it,” including sole-
ly circumstantial evidence.84 In the common law system, now-canonical 
rules and practices like the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and judicial 
review of the sufficiency of evidence were centuries in the future. After the 
Fourth Lateran Council ended trial by ordeal in 1215,85 the civil law moved 
in a very different direction than the English common law, which delegated 
fact-finding to a lay jury that could convict based on whatever evidence it 
found persuasive. By contrast, the Roman-canon law of proof that governed 
civil law criminal procedure required that inquisitorial judges find guilt to 
be certain,86 and accept as proof only two eyewitnesses or the confession of 
the accused, as the preambles to the two Henrican statutes accurately re-
count.87 Circumstantial evidence could not be the sole basis for a convic-
tion.88 As a result of these exacting proof requirements, civil law systems 
turned to torture to extract the needed confession.89 Except in certain unusu-
al cases, in which the crown ordered it and immunized those administering 
it, torture was not used to extract evidence of guilt in English criminal pro-
cedure.90 This does not reflect a superior public morality on the part of the 
83. An Acte for punysshement of Pyrotes and Robbers of the See (Offenses at Sea 
Act), 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, § 1 (1536); see also An Acte Conc[er]nyng Pyrottes and Robbers of the 
See, 27 Hen. 8 c. 4, § 1 (1535). Two “almost identical acts passed in consecutive years ap-
pears to have been a consequence of the first not specifying treason as being within its scope, 
something that was corrected by the second statute. After 1536 this [second statute] was the 
only act normally referred to.” DURSTON, supra note 41, at 11–12.
84. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF: EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN 
THE ANCIEN RÉGIME 78, 138 (2006 ed.). To convict, a common law jury required “not cer-
tainty, but only persuasion. Well into the eighteenth century there were no firm rules estab-
lishing minimum standards of evidence for conviction” at common law. Id. at 80.
85. Id. at 6; THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200–1800, at 3 (1985).
86. LANGBEIN, supra note 84, at 6–7.
87. Id. at 4; DURSTON, supra note 41, at 8–9.
88. LANGBEIN, supra note 84, at 4; DURSTON, supra note 41, at 9.
89. LANGBEIN, supra note 84, at 4–5.
90. Id. at 81–139; DURSTON, supra note 41, at 9. Sometimes extrajudicial torture was 
used on pirates during interrogations held for intelligence purposes—to elicit the names of 
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English, but simply the fact that their common law proof system did not re-
quire confessions.
Expressly in order to make conviction easier—not out of a concern for 
individual rights such as jury trial—the statutes of Henry VIII moved the 
trial of piracies from civil law procedure to trial by the common law, or “af-
ter the comon course of the lawes of this Lande.”91 Trial of piracies would 
still occur under the auspices of the Admiralty. The statutes provided that 
the king would send out a commission under the great seal to the Lord Ad-
miral or his deputies, who would assemble as an ad hoc court with “three or 
foure such other substanciall p[er]sons” named by the Lord Chancellor.92 In 
practice, the other substantial persons named were frequently common law 
judges, who joined the civilian judges of admiralty to hear the cases of pira-
cy and other serious admiralty crimes.93 Grand juries and petit juries were 
assembled from the shires and places in the realm specified in the king’s
commission.94 These courts proceedings became known as the Admiralty 
Sessions.95
This move to common law procedure facilitated convictions for piracy 
because circumstantial evidence alone was now legally sufficient,96 and a 
much looser burden of proof was employed by the lay factfinders. In addi-
tion, pirates who refused to plead guilty or not guilty—one or the other was 
required in order to manifest the necessary consent to a jury trial—could 
now be subject to “pressing” or, in medieval Latin, peine forte et dure.97 As 
John Langbein explains, pressing entailed the defendant being “laid over 
with weights that would crush him to death unless he relented” by entering a 
plea and thereby consenting to jury trial.98 Civil liberties were far from the 
confederates. See CLAIRE JOWITT, THE CULTURE OF PIRACY, 1580–1630: ENGLISH 
LITERATURE AND SEABORNE CRIME 21 (2010) (describing an interrogation of pirates at the 
Tower of London in 1583 employing torture).
91. Offenses at Sea Act 1536, 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, § 1; see also 27 Hen. 8 c. 4, § 1 (1535).
92. 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, § 1.
93. See DURSTON, supra note 41, at 53; A.T. CARTER, OUTLINES OF ENGLISH LEGAL 
HISTORY 139 (London, Butterworth & Co. 1899).
94. 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, §§ 1–2.
95. DURSTON, supra note 41, at 1, 12–13.
96. See HANNA, supra note 27, at 30–31 (noting that pirates could be convicted based 
solely on circumstantial evidence).
97. See COKE, supra note 65, at 111–12 (London, E. & R. Brooke 1797); MOLLOY,
supra note 71, at 70–71; 2 EDWARD HYDE EAST, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN
812 (Philadelphia, P. Byrne, 1806).
98. LANGBEIN, supra note 84, at 76. Langbein explains that wealthy defendants often 
chose death in this manner rather than consenting to jury trial in which they might be convict-
ed, because conviction of a felony would bring forfeiture of one’s estate. Pre-conviction death 
by pressing meant that one’s estate could descend to heirs. See id. at 75; see also BRYCE 
LYON, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 637 (2d ed. 1980) 
(explaining the same point as Langbein).
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mind of Henry VIII and Parliament when they enacted these anti-piracy 
statutes.
2. The Uncertain and Evolving Meaning of Due Process
Due process, at the time of the Henrican statutes and for centuries af-
terwards, did not have the purity that Chapman posits—a requirement of the 
jury, for anyone, anywhere, formally charged with a crime by the English 
government. Since this lesser claim by Chapman is incorrect, a fortiori his 
stronger claim—that anyone who was suspected of engaging in conduct that 
violated criminal or civil statutes could only be proceeded against by full 
common law judicial procedure—also fails.
Magna Carta’s seemingly broad provisions in favor of liberty were in-
terpreted quite narrowly through the medieval period.99 Non-jury forms of 
criminal process were thought to be entirely legal well into the seventeenth 
century. Trial by battle, for example, was an available alternative to jury tri-
al for centuries, although little used.100 Throughout the Tudor period, the 
king’s council exercised criminal powers, disregarding contrary statutes of 
Parliament, though according to the historian Frederic Maitland, “the coun-
cil seems always to have shrunk from pronouncing the penalty of death.”101
The Court of Star Chamber, which used civil-inquisitorial procedure, exer-
cised a “very comprehensive criminal jurisdiction,” though also stopping 
short of inflicting the death penalty, from the late fifteenth to the mid-
seventeenth century.102 Maitland thinks it beyond doubt that Star Chamber 
and its procedure “was regarded as perfectly legal” through the reign of 
James I (1603-25).103 During the troubled reign of Charles I (1625-49), Star
Chamber became overtly political and aggressively prosecuted political and 
religious dissent. Its legality was then attacked by common lawyers like 
Edward Coke, and Parliament eventually abolished it.104 Until the Long Par-
liament overthrew Charles I and moved against prerogative courts, the 
Court of High Commission, an ecclesiastical court using canon-civil law 
procedure, had also exercised a criminal jurisdiction over the laity.105
99. See J.H. Baker, Personal Liberty Under the Common Law of England, 1200–1600,
in THE ORIGINS OF MODERN FREEDOM IN THE WEST 178, 191 (R.W. Davis ed., 1995). On the 
feudal context and meaning of Magna Carta, see G.O. SAYLES, THE MEDIEVAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLAND 399–408 (1950).
100. See F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 212 (1919).
101. Id. at 217–19.
102. Id. at 219–21, 261–63; see also BAKER, supra note 21, at 119; LYON, supra note 
98, at 616; Thomas G. Barnes, Due Process and Slow Process in the Late Elizabethan-Early 
Stuart Star Chamber, 6 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 221, 227–31 (1962).
103. MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 262.
104. BAKER, supra note 21, at 472–74.
105. MAITLAND, supra note 100, at 264–66.
Fall 2018] Piracy and Due Process 403
Criminal procedure that departed from the common lawyers’ ideal was 
also used in distant, difficult to govern parts of the realm. For instance, after 
a Catholic revolt, Henry VIII created the Council of the North, a non-
statutory administrative and judicial body for York and other rebellious 
northern counties.106 The council exercised a criminal jurisdiction, according 
to the king’s commission, “to hear and determine [criminal cases] according 
to the laws and customs of our Realm of England, or otherwise according to 
your sound discretion.”107
The common lawyers did largely triumph during the battles of the sev-
enteenth century—well over one hundred years after the anti-piracy statutes 
of Henry VIII. To a great extent, the criminal jurisdiction of courts which 
did not follow full common law procedure was removed—Star Chamber, 
the Court of High Commission, the Council of the North, and an analogous 
conciliar court for Wales and the Welsh March were abolished by Parlia-
ment in 1641.108 At the same time, Parliament re-enacted the “law of the 
land” provision of Magna Carta and the “due process of law” clauses of 
statutes from the time of Edward III—suggesting that common law proce-
dure was the process that was due in criminal cases.109 During the crises of 
the seventeenth century, common lawyers and their Parliamentary allies 
pressed hard the idea that fundamental English liberties, such as jury trial, 
could never lawfully be withheld from a criminal defendant.110
The common law of criminal procedure continued its advance even af-
ter the Restoration of the monarchy in 1660. But it did not fully vanquish all 
competitors. Both as a matter of theory and practice, common law criminal 
procedure with its jury trial never attained the supremacy and universality 
that Chapman claims. First, as a matter of theory, parliamentary supremacy 
and the absence of American-style judicial review meant that claims of fun-
damental, non-derogable rights to certain legal procedures were tenuous, 
especially after the enormous assertion of parliamentary power represented 
by the Glorious Revolution of 1688.111 By Blackstone’s time, the supremacy 
106. Id. at 263–64.
107. R.R. REID, THE KING’S COUNCIL IN THE NORTH 282 (1921) (emphasis added).
108. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 193 
(Liberty Fund 2010) (1929); PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO 
EMPIRE 224–25 (2010); see also An Act for the Regulating of the Privy Council and for tak-
ing away the Court commonly called the Star–Chamber (Habeas Corpus Act), 16 Car. c. 10, § 
1 (1640). The Petition of Right of 1628 had also re-enacted those clauses. See Petition of 
Right, 3 Car. c. 1, §§ 3–4 (1628) (reaffirming “law of the land” and “due process of law” pro-
visions).
109. The Petition of Right of 1628 had also re-enacted those clauses. See Petition of 
Right, 3 Car. c. 1, §§ 3–4 (1628) (reaffirming “law of the land” and “due process of law” pro-
visions).
110. See J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
123 (1955).
111. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 208–11; PLUCKNETT, supra note 108, at 336–37.
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of Parliament was orthodoxy in England.112 Parliament could change proce-
dure, and this could become the new “law of the land” and new “due pro-
cess.” Common lawyers might object, and these objections would have the 
weight of arguments about violation of the “ancient constitution” to buttress 
them.113 But Parliament’s expressed will would still control.
In addition, there were geographical limits to the reach of English liber-
ties, especially for aliens (as those who were not English subjects were 
called). Englishmen residing abroad in the colonies and other English pos-
sessions were understood to carry with them most of their traditional, fun-
damental liberties, though there were of course disputes about the precise 
content.114 Englishmen who encountered English governmental power in 
other locations could likely also draw on their English liberties. The rules 
were different, however, for those who were not English subjects. At com-
mon law, protection of the laws was understood to stand in a reciprocal rela-
tionship with allegiance to the government.115 Only persons owing alle-
giance to the government were under the protection of the government and 
its laws and courts. Only persons within protection because of their alle-
giance had standing to invoke the protection of the courts and were shielded 
by rights under domestic law. Subjects paradigmatically owed allegiance 
and were within protection.116 Non-subjects, when peacefully visiting or re-
siding in England, owed a local or temporary allegiance to the government,
and so they temporarily had corresponding protection.117 That protection 
112. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *156, *178. See generally GORDON S.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 260–61 (1998); John 
Phillip Reid, “In Our Contracted Sphere”: The Constitutional Contract, the Stamp Act Crisis, 
and the Coming of the American Revolution, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 21, 42–43 (1976).
113. See generally J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND FEUDAL LAW
(1987) (showing how Coke and other common lawyers ahistorically argued that common law 
procedures had existed from time immemorial).
114. See, e.g., Eliga H. Gould, Liberty and Modernity: The American Revolution and the 
Marking of Parliament’s Imperial History, in EXCLUSIONARY EMPIRE: ENGLISH LIBERTY 
OVERSEAS, 1600–1900, at 112, 113 (Jack P. Greene ed., 2010); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, English 
Liberties Outside England: Floors, Doors, Windows, and Ceilings in the Legal Architecture of 
Empire, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ENGLISH LAW AND LITERATURE, 1500–1700, at 747, 
747–49 (Lorna Hutson ed., 2017).
115. This paragraph is based on Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 1823 passim (2009); Andrew Kent, Judicial Review for Enemy Fighters: The Court’s
Fateful Turn in Ex parte Quirin, the Nazi Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. L. REV. 153, 176–96
(2013) [hereinafter Kent, Enemy Fighters]; Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 502–
05.
116. See 1 MATTHEW HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF 
PLEAS OF THE CROWN 59 (The Savoy, E. & R. Nutt, & R. Gosling 1736); 1 BLACKSTONE,
supra note 75, at *354; see also Kent, Enemy Fighters, supra note 115, at 177.
117. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *358; M[ICHAEL] FOSTER, A REPORT OF 
SOME PROCEEDINGS ON THE COMMISSION OF OYER AND TERMINER AND GAOL DELIVERY
FOR THE TRIAL OF THE REBELS IN THE YEAR 1746 IN THE COUNTY OF SURRY, AND OF OTHER 
CROWN CASES 183 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1762); see also Hamburger, supra note 115, at 
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disappeared, however, when the obligation of allegiance did—in other 
words, when the foreigner left the country. As Blackstone put it, “as the 
prince affords his protection to an alien, only during his residence in this 
realm, the allegiance of an alien is confined (in point of time) to the duration 
of such his residence, and (in point of locality) to the dominions of the Brit-
ish empire.”118 This fundamental legal framework structured how the gov-
ernment evaluated the entitlement of different persons and different places 
to protection of domestic law and courts. As we will see, the English gov-
ernment and legal commentators referred to this framework and incorpo-
rated its premises when thinking about the law of piracy suppression.
In practice, even after the common lawyers largely triumphed in the 
seventeenth century, not all crimes were adjudicated with full common law 
procedure. For instance, justices of the peace had long had authority to hear 
crimes of a lesser grade than felony without a jury, and this was expanded 
greatly after the Restoration.119
And then there was the case of piracy and related crimes committed on 
the high seas. As discussed, since 1535–36, these crimes were tried at Ad-
miralty Sessions using common law criminal procedure, including a grand 
jury and petit jury. But as we have seen, the change to common law proce-
dure was not motivated by a belief that there was fundamental legal entitle-
ment to such procedure. Blackstone, the great partisan for the common law, 
was grossly embellishing when he claimed that the Henrican anti-piracy 
statutes were motivated by a concern for individual rights under the com-
mon law.120 Chapman appears to uncritically accept Blackstone’s error.121
Blackstone is correct, however, that after upheaval of the seventeenth centu-
ry, the common lawyers’ long-held view that an English court should not 
inflict the death penalty except via common law procedures prevailed, and 
the argument that these procedures should be extended to non-petty but non-
capital crimes was gaining force.
3. The Anti-Piracy Statute of William III
Chapman presents as an unfortunate deviation from a supposed com-
mon law norm the decision of Parliament near the turn of the eighteenth 
century to allow piracies to be tried without a jury in specially-constituted 
1847, 1898–1901; Kent, Enemy Fighters, supra note 115, at 177; Kent, Global Constitution,
supra note 7, at 503.
118. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *370.
119. PLUCKNETT, supra note 108, at 438–39.
120. See supra Blackstone quotation accompanying note 79; see also BLACKSTONE, su-
pra note 75, at *265 (stating that the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction under civil law proce-
dures “was contrary to the genius of the law of England; inasmuch as a man might there be 
deprived of his life by the opinion of a single judge, without the judgment of his peers.”).
121. Chapman, supra note 15, at 394.
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admiralty courts located in English colonies or on shipboard.122 For Chap-
man, this statute was an “exception” for pirates “from common law protec-
tions . . . for the sake of expediency.”123 But he presents no evidence sug-
gesting that either colonists in the Americas or Englishmen back home 
viewed these courts as illegal.
To be sure, American colonists did complain about Britain’s novel uses 
of vice-admiralty courts in the colonies. The courts, which sat without juries 
and followed civil law procedure, were specifically enumerated in formal 
accounts of the colonial Americans’ reasons for dissatisfaction with the 
British government and, eventually, the need for revolution. For instance, 
the Declaration of the so-called Stamp Act Congress in 1765 stated that “tri-
al by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British subject in 
these colonies,” and that the Stamp Act “and several other acts, by extend-
ing the jurisdiction of the courts of admiralty beyond its ancient limits, have 
a manifest tendency to subvert the rights and liberties of the colonists.”124
The Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking Up Arms, adopted 
by the Continental Congress on July 6, 1775, stated:
[S]tatutes have been passed for extending the Jurisdiction of Courts 
of Admiralty and Vice-Admiralty beyond their ancient limits; for 
depriving us of the accustomed and inestimable Privilege of Trial 
by Jury in Cases affecting both Life and Property.125
And one year later, the Declaration of Independence admonished King 
George III “[f]or depriving us in many cases, of the benefit of Trial by Ju-
ry.”126
Chapman links these grievances127 to the statute of William III’s time, 
An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracies, which allowed pira-
cies and related high-seas felonies to be tried without a jury in specially-
constituted admiralty courts located in English colonies or on shipboard.128
122. See An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 11 Will. 3 c. 7, § 4 (1698) 
(stating that the courts will hear cases “according to the civil law and the methods and rules of 
the Admiralty”).
123. Chapman, supra note 15, at 394–95.
124. An Act for granting and applying certain Stamp Duties and other Duties in the Brit-
ish Colonies and Plantations in America (the Stamp Act), 5 Geo. 3 c. 12 (1765). In June 1765, 
soon after the passage of the act, the Massachusetts legislature sent a circular inviting all the 
colonies to send delegates to a congress at New York in October, 1765 to develop a joint pro-
test against the Stamp Act and other imperial trade regulations. Representatives from Massa-
chusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, Mary-
land, and South Carolina attended.
125. DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF TAKING UP ARMS (1775), re-
printed in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 295, 295 (Richard L. Perry ed., rev. ed. 1978).
126. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (1776).
127. Chapman, supra note 15, at 381, 389, 397.
128. See An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 11 Will. 3, c. 7, § 4 
(1698) (stating that the courts will hear cases “according to the civil law and the methods and 
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His suggestion appears to be that American colonists were also objecting to 
jury-less trials of pirates when they protested the Stamp Act and other trade 
regulations that allowed revenue cases to be heard, at the option of the gov-
ernment, either in vice-admiralty courts without a jury or in common law 
courts with one. But Chapman presents no evidence of any linkage in the 
minds of American colonists, and I have found none.
First of all, the colonial vice-admiralty courts that Americans protested 
against were legally and institutionally distinct from the courts in which pi-
racies could be tried without a jury. Just as piracies in England were tried 
not in the standing High Court Admiralty but in ad hoc Admiralty Sessions 
convened periodically under a commission issued by the crown,129 trials of 
pirates held in the colonies or on shipboard under the new statute of William 
III occurred not in standing colonial vice-admiralty courts but in ad hoc 
courts created for the occasion.130 The judge of the standing colonial vice-
admiralty court was often appointed to be a member of the bench of the ad 
hoc sessions, and so these court sessions for trying piracies outside of Eng-
land were sometimes referred to as sittings of the vice-admiralty court.131
But that was not strictly accurate. The regularly-constituted colonial vice-
admiralty courts did not and could not try piracies or other felonies on the 
high seas.132
It is unclear if many piracy trials in the colonies actually took place 
without a jury, even though that option was legally available.133 And Chap-
rules of the Admiralty”). By the same statute, admiralty sessions for trial of piracies could also 
be convened in the colonies under the statute of the Offenses at Seas Act of 1536, see id. § 14, 
something that had been determined in 1684 was not allowed under then-existing law. See
JOEL H. BAER, PIRATES OF THE BRITISH ISLES 25 (2005).
129. Offenses at Sea Act of 1536, 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, § 1.
130. See DAVID R. OWEN & MICHAEL C. TOLLEY, COURTS OF ADMIRALTY IN 
COLONIAL AMERICA: THE MARYLAND EXPERIENCE, 1634–1776, at 5–6 (1995); CARL 
UBBELOHDE, THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 17 n.18 
(1960); Charles M. Andrews, Introduction to RECORDS OF THE VICE-ADMIRALTY COURTS OF 
RHODE ISLAND: 1716–1752, at 1, 3–4 (Dorothy S. Towle ed., 1936).
131. Andrews, supra note 130, at 4 n.1.
132. OWEN & TOLLEY, supra note 130, at 5–6; UBBELOHDE, supra note 130, at 17 n.18; 
Andrews, supra note 130, at 3.
133. The piracy act of William III allowed piracy trials in the colonies to occur in either 
vice-admiralty or under the statute of 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, which would mean using a jury. See An 
Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Piracy, 11 Will. 3 c. 7, § 14(1698). That act expired 
after seven years plus the term of Parliament then sitting, see id. § 13, but it was renewed sev-
eral times, then made permanent in 1719. See 6 Geo. c. 19 (1719). And before then, in 1717, 
Parliament provided again that persons to be tried under 11 Will. 3 c. 7 “may be” instead tried 
according to the procedures of 28 Hen. 8 c. 15. 4 Geo. c. 11, § 7 (1717). Reports of piracy 
trials in the colonies reveal that juries were sometimes used and sometimes not. See, e.g., The 
Trials of Major Stede Bonnet and Thirty Three Others, at the Court of Vice-Admiralty at 
Charles-Town in South Carolina, for Piracy, Octob. 30, &c. 1718, in 6 A COMPLETE 
COLLECTION OF STATE-TRIALS, AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER 
CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS; FROM THE REIGN OF KING RICHARD II TO THE END OF THE 
REIGN OF KING GEORGE I 156 (2d ed., London, 1730) (jury trial) [hereinafter Stede Bonnet 
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man has not established that there was any major current of opinion that 
viewed jury-less trials of pirates as unlawful. American colonial lawyers 
were well aware that the move to common law procedure in the statutes of 
Henry VIII was motivated by a desire to make it easier to convict, rather 
than a view that accused pirates were entitled to a jury. We know this indi-
rectly because many printed authorities available to Americans recounted 
the true reasons for the statutory change.134 And we see direct evidence of 
this knowledge in legal arguments by, for instance, John Adams, in a 1769 
piracy case before an admiralty court in Boston,135 and in statements by oth-
er American colonial lawyers.136 Since it was known that common law pro-
cedure in piracy cases was not motivated by civil liberties concerns, it is not 
clear that the absence of a jury would have been viewed with much disfavor.
Further evidence of an apparent lack of concern about jury-less trials of 
pirates during the colonial period comes from a post-independence docu-
ment produced by John Jay, while serving as the Secretary for Foreign Af-
fairs to the Continental Congress in 1785. In discussing what powers his 
government had under the Articles of Confederation with regard to trial of 
piracy, Jay described the anti-piracy act of William III in a positive light. He 
wrote that the statute “rendered more extensive and effectual” the crown’s
powers to prosecute piracy and enacted “many useful Things on this Sub-
ject.”137
In any event, American colonial-era protests about vice-admiralty 
courts were clearly directed at a very different phenomenon than piracy tri-
Trial]; The Trial and Condemnation of Captain John Quelch and Others of his Company, &c. 
for Sundry Piracies, Robberies, and Murder, Committed upon the Subjects of the King of Por-
tugal, Her Majesty’s Ally, on the coast of Brazil, &c., at the Court-House in Boston, in 14 A
COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND 
OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 1067, 1073–74 (London, T.C. Hansard 1812) (bench 
trial) [hereinafter John Quelch Trial].
134. See, e.g., COKE, supra note 65, at 111–12 (describing the “mischief” which moti-
vated the Offenses at Sea Act of 1536, 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, as set out in the preamble); A
DISCOURSE OF THE LAWS RELATING TO PIRATES AND PIRACIES, AND THE MARINE AFFAIRS 
OF GREAT BRITAIN 7–8 (London, W. Wilkins 1726) (setting out the preamble of 28 Hen. 8 c. 
15); WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 98 (The Savoy, Eliz. 
Nutt 1716) (stating that the Henrican statutes were enacted because proving piracy and other 
crimes under civil law procedures was “very inconvenient, because by that Law no Offender 
shall have Judgment of Death, without his own Confession, or direct proof by Eye-
Witnesses[.]”). For later post-Revolutionary works published in the United States, see 5 
MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 311 (1st American ed., Philadelphia, 
Phillip H. Nicklin 1813) (1768); 7 NATHAN DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST 
OF AMERICAN LAW 91 (Boston, Cummings, Hilliard & Co. 1824).
135. 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 526–28 (Charles Francis Adams ed., Boston, 
Charles C Little & James Brown 1850).
136. See John Quelch Trial, supra note 133, at 1074, 1086 (statements of Queen’s Ad-
vocate and Attorney General Paul Dudley).
137. 29 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 797 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 
1933).
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als—which, as noted above, did not occur in the ordinary vice-admiralty 
courts. Americans protested navigation and trade laws like the Stamp and 
Sugar Acts of 1764 and 1765138 because of taxation without representation 
in Parliament, in violation of their claimed rights as Englishmen,139 and be-
cause the statutes allowed the bypassing of colonial juries in the common 
law courts when crown officials chose to seek forfeitures of property or 
fines and penalties via vice-admiralty courts.140 It was these complaints, not 
any concern about jury-less trial of pirates, that appeared in the Declaration 
of Independence, the Declaration of the Causes and Necessity for Taking 
Up Arms, and countless other, lesser-known American colonial complaints 
about courts and juries.
C. English Government Practice
1. Pirates on the Seas Were Outside the Protection of English Law
English government practice was inconsistent with Chapman’s claim 
that anyone, anywhere, who was suspected of violating English criminal 
statutes could only be dealt with by the English government via the criminal 
justice system (using common law procedures). There is abundant evidence 
that the English and, after the 1706–07 Acts of Union, British government 
did not believe that it was compelled by domestic law—common law due 
process rights of individuals—to treat all pirates it encountered as putative 
criminal defendants who could only be proceeded against by the ordinary 
course of law. Both the Royal Navy and colonial forces in the Americas 
138. Sugar Act, 4 Geo. 3 c. 15 (1764); Stamp Act , 5 Geo. 3 c. 12 (1765). On these acts 
and the American reaction, see, for example, EDMUND S. MORGAN & HELEN M. MORGAN,
THE STAMP ACT CRISIS: PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION (3d ed. 1995). See generally
LAWRENCE A. HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS (1939).
139. See, e.g., The Virginia Resolves (1765), reprinted in PROLOGUE TO REVOLUTION:
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–??????????????????????mund 
S. Morgan ed., 1959); The Rhode Island Resolves (1765), reprinted in PROLOGUE TO 
REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766, supra, at 
????????????????? ??????????????????? ????????????????????????? ????????????????????????JOHN 
PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY 
TO TAX (1987).
140. See, e.g., The Pennsylvania Resolves (1765), reprinted in PROLOGUE TO 
REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766, supra
note 139?? ??? ???? ??????? ???? ????????? ????????? ???????? reprinted in PROLOGUE TO 
REVOLUTION: SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS ON THE STAMP ACT CRISIS, 1764–1766, supra
note 139?? ????????????????? ????????????? ?????????? ??????JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF 
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ??????????????OWEN & TOLLEY, supra note 
130, at 5; Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of Colonial Vice-Admiralty Courts (Part I), 26 
J. MARITIME L. & COMMERCE 581, 594 (1995); David S. Lovejoy, Rights Imply Equality: The 
Case Against Admiralty Jurisdiction in America, 1764–1776, 16 WM. & MARY Q. 459, 
??????????????
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killed large numbers of pirates in combat actions,141 and also summarily ex-
ecuted captured pirates.142 Although it may often be true that actions speak 
louder than words, in this context the opposite is the case. During the heat of 
confrontation with a hated enemy, military and law enforcement officials 
sometimes get carried away by emotion or passion. Merely observing the 
infliction of, say, summary executions or failing to give quarter does not tell 
us definitely that those actions comported with legal understandings. In this 
context, the better evidence is what statutes, royal proclamations, commis-
sions, and other official pronouncements of the law stated, as well as what 
lawyers, jurists, and other commentators said about the law. There we see 
voluminous evidence against Chapman’s thesis.
Following the well-settled rule of the law of nations,143 English law 
treated pirates encountered on the seas as persons outside of the protection 
of the laws. Queen Elizabeth in 1569 proclaimed “all pyrats and rovers upon 
141. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. PASTORE, BETWEEN LAND AND SEA: THE ATLANTIC 
COAST AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF NEW ENGLAND 165 (2014) (describing 1723 battle in 
which a Royal Navy warship killed and captured pirates off Long Island); Letter from Captain 
Ogle, Commander of HM’s Ship Swallow, to the Admiralty Office (Apr. 5, 1722), in A FULL 
AND EXACT ACCOUNT, OF THE TRYAL OF ALL THE PYRATES, LATELY TAKEN BY CAPTAIN 
OGLE, ON BOARD THE SWALLOW MAN OF WAR, ON THE COAST OF GUINEA, at iv–vi (Lon-
don, J. Roberts 1723) (recounting two ship-to-ship actions in which at least 27 pirates were 
killed or wounded off Africa); CALENDAR OF TREASURY PAPERS, ?????????? at 467 (Joseph 
Redington ed., London, Longmans & Co. 1883) (“As to the claims of Capt. Gordon, of H.M. 
ship ‘Pearl,’ and Capt. Brand, of H.M. ship the ‘Lyme,’ the Lieut.-Governor of Virginia 
(Spotswood) certifies that two ships were hired and furnished with pilots at his expense, and 
armed by Gordon and Brand, and were sent to North Carolina to apprehend and destroy Ed-
ward Thatch, a notorious pirate, and his crew. Ten pirates were killed on Thatch’s sloop, and 
eight more taken prisoner. Four other pirates . . . were taken by Capt. Gordon, and convicted 
before the Court of Admiralty.”); CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS: COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA 
AND WEST INDIES, 1661–1668, at 284 (W. Noel Sainsbury ed., London, HM’s Stationery Of-
fice 1880) (describing combat action in which an English naval vessel off Jamaica killed a 
pirate captain and “many of his men,” bringing in twelve prisoners) (entry 950).
142. See, e.g., C.H. HARING, THE BUCCANEERS IN THE WEST INDIES IN THE XVII
CENTURY 254 (1910) (“Captain Spragge [commanding HMS Ruby in 1687] sailed into Port 
Royal with the buccaneer and three of his companions hanging at the yard-arms, ‘a spectacle 
of great satisfaction to all good people.’”) (citation omitted); CALENDAR OF TREASURY 
PAPERS, 1714–1719, supra note 141, at 467 (“The Governor of South Carolina (Robert John-
son, Esq.), appointed Col. Wm. Rhett to be commander of two sloops fitted out to take certain 
pirates which infested the coast, and the Col. at Cape Fear River, took a pirate sloop called the 
‘Revenge,’ . . . and the commander and crew, consisting of 35 men, were executed. Petitioner 
Rhett prayed an order for payment to him of 890l. for the captors.”); see also 1 J. FENIMORE 
COOPER, THE HISTORY OF THE NAVY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 21 (Philadelphia, 
Lea & Blanchard 1839) (discussing the Col. Rhett attack and stating that “a desperate encoun-
ter took place, in which, it would seem, it was the intention not to give quarter, as nearly all in 
the [pirate] sloop were killed” and the remainder tried).
143. Supra Section II.A.
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the seas to be out of her protection” and “public enemies[.]”144 David Lewes, 
a judge of the Admiralty, reiterated in about 1579  that the queen’s procla-
mation meant that “all pyrats and rovers upon the seas” may be “lawful-
ly . . . by any person taken, punished, and suppressed with extremity.”145 Sir 
Leoline Jenkins, another judge of the Admiralty, instructed a jury in 1668 
that “all Pirates and Searovers . . . are outlaw’d, as I may say, by the Law of 
all Nations; that is, out of the Protection of all Princes and all Laws whatso-
ever. Every Body is commissioned, and is to be armed against them, as 
against Rebels and Traytors, to subdue and to root them out.”146 King James 
I in 1603 proclaimed that “Pirats and Rovers upon the Seas” were outside 
the protection of the king and his laws and “lawfully [may] bee by any per-
son taken, punished, and suppressed with extremitie.”147
International law—when it deemed pirates outside the protection of the 
law—was treating the high seas as a state of nature where the inherent right 
to lethal self-defense was always available. Domestically, when monarchs 
and their Admiralty judges stated that pirates were outside the law, even if 
the pirates were English subjects, they were referencing the ancient judg-
ment of outlawry. Outlawry, “one of the oldest weapons of the Common 
Law,” meant that the person against who such judgment was entered—for 
evading legal process after indictment for treason or felony—was “entirely 
beyond the protection of the law in every sense.”148 An outlaw “was said to 
have caput lupinum, in other words to be like a wolf, a hateful beast which 
it was the duty of every man to exterminate.”149 In the thirteenth century, the 
medieval jurist Henry de Bracton reported that it was lawful to kill outright 
an outlaw within the realm only in essentially lawless regions, like the 
144. 1 DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 224 (R. G. 
Marsden ed., 1915) (referring to the proclamation); see also ALFRED P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF 
PIRACY 59 (2d ed. 1998) (dating the proclamation).
145. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA, supra note 144, at 
224.
146. 1 WILLIAM WYNNE, THE LIFE OF SIR LEOLINE JENKINS, at xxxvi (London, 1724), 
reprinted in 3 EDWIN DEWITT DICKINSON, A SELECTION OF CASES AND OTHER READINGS 
ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 518, 518 (1929).
147. King James I, A Proclamation to Represse all Piracies and Depredations upon the 
Sea (Sept. 30, 1603), in STUART ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS: ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS OF KING 
JAMES I, 1603–1625, at 53, 55 (James F. Larkin & Paul L. Hughes eds., 1973); see also King 
James I, A Proclamation with Certaine Ordinances to be Observed by his Majesties Subjects 
Toward the King of Spain (July 6, 1605), in STUART ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS: ROYAL 
PROCLAMATIONS OF KING JAMES I, 1603–1625, supra, at 114, 116. The 1603 proclamation 
also had a law enforcement directive, ordering that pirate cases be “summarily heard” by the 
Admiralty so that punishment may be inflicted “with such severities, as the example thereof 
shall terrifie all others from committing any so odious crimes.” King James I, A Proclamation 
to Represse all Piracies and Depredations upon the Sea (Sept. 30, 1603) at 53, 54.
148. H. Erle Richards, Is Outlawry Obsolete?, 18 L.Q. REV. 297, 298 (1902).
149. Id.; accord 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE 
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 502 (Liberty Fund 2010) (1895).
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Welsh March.150 The law of outlawry again softened during the reign of 
Edward III (1327–77), so that only a crown officer with a judicial warrant 
could kill the outlaw on sight.151 But even so, if caught, the outlaw was hung 
without trial.152 Although additional judicial and royal means to lessen the 
harshness of outlawry were introduced over time, the basic concept persist-
ed for centuries.153
It was thus a profound statement of pirates’ lack of protection from the 
laws to state that they could be treated as ancient outlaws. Pirates were fre-
quently described as beasts—a shorthand way of linking their fate to that of 
outlaws. Charles Molloy, the seventeenth century barrister and maritime law 
treatise writer, wrote that anyone who captures pirates on the ocean “may 
execute such Beasts of Prey immediately, without any Solemnity of Con-
demnation.”154 And further, if captors did bring pirates to port to stand trial, 
but “the Judge openly rejects the Tryal, or the Captors cannot wait for the 
Judge without certain peril and loss,” the pirates may, by the “Law of Na-
ture,” be “executed by the Captors.”155 A writer of another popular marine 
law treatise declared in the early eighteenth century that it was “the duty of 
all Princes, Potentates and People whatsoever, to do what is in their Power 
for the total Extirpation of” pirates, which he called “ravenous Beasts,”156
thus invoking the language of the ancient law of outlawry.
Calling pirates “ravenous beasts” or “beasts of prey,” in addition to ref-
erencing outlawry and the right of self-defense in the state of nature, may 
also have been an invocation by analogy of the old common law rule that 
allowed anyone to kill dangerous beasts, even on another person’s private 
land, “because the destroying of such creatures is a public advantage.”157
Linking pirates to ravenous beasts thus triply marked them as fair game—by 
the law of nations, the common law of outlawry, and the common law of 
game hunting—as long as pirates were encountered on the high seas and not 
near a place where common law trial could be had.
150. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 149, at 503.
151. See 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 81, at 605 & n.2; GILES JACOB, THE MODERN 
JUSTICE 166 (London, 1716); 3 BACON, supra note 134, at 746 (London, W. Strahan & M. 
Woodhall 1778).
152. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 81, at 605; see also GREEN, supra note 85???????????
153. 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 81?????????
154. MOLLOY, supra note 71, at 61.
155. Id.
156. ALEXANDER JUSTICE, A GENERAL TREATISE OF THE DOMINION OF THE SEA 475 
(2d ed., London, D. Leach 1709).
157. 2 ZEPHANIAH SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 75 
(Windham, John Byrne 1795); accord 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *416; 2 RICHARD 
BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 52 (6th ed., London, Henry Lintot 
Law Printer 1758); THE GAME LAW ?????? ???? ????? ???????? ???????? ?? ??????? ???????
1707).
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Thus in 1718, Nicholas Trott, Chief Justice of the Province of South 
Carolina and a judge of vice-admiralty, told a grand jury that “in our law,”
pirates “are termed ‘Brutes’ and ‘Beasts of Prey’: and that it is lawful for 
any one that takes them, if they cannot with Safety to themselves bring them 
under some Government to be tried, to put them to Death.”158 In 1704, dur-
ing the trial of the pirate Captain John Quelch, the Attorney General for the 
Massachusetts Bay colony and her Majesty’s advocate for the court of ad-
miralty, Paul Dudley, told the court and jurors:
[P]irates are not entitled to law . . . [f]or which reason it is said, if 
piracy be committed upon the ocean, and the pirates in the attempt 
happen to be overcome, the captors are not obliged to bring them to 
any port, but may expose them immediately to punishment, by 
hanging them at the main-yard; a sign of it being of a very different 
and worse nature than any crime committed upon the land; for rob-
bers and murderers, and even traitors themselves, may not be put to 
death without passing a formal trial.159
James Smith, the King’s Advocate General argued to an admiralty court 
in very similar terms at a piracy trial in Massachusetts Bay colony in 1717:
[T]he Law of all Nations, that have setled into regular Govern-
ments, define & declare a Pirate to be an Enemy of Mankind. And 
therefore he can claim the Protection of no Prince, the privilege of 
no Country, the benefit of no Law; He is denied common humani-
ty . . . nor is he to be otherwise dealt with, than a wild & savage 
Beast, which every Man may lawfully destroy.160
Sir David Dalrymple, Her Majesty’s Solicitor, argued at a 1705 piracy 
trial that “pirates are worse than ravenous beasts,” because they are in “per-
petual War with every Individual.”161 A law compilation published in 1767 
in Britain for use of the Admiralty agreed: “Captors are not oblig’d to bring 
the Pirates they take on the Ocean to any Port, but may punish them imme-
diately, by hanging them up at the Main-Yard End.”162
158. Stede Bonnet Trial, supra note 133, at 156, 158.
159. John Quelch Trial, supra note 133?????????????
160. THE TRIALS OF EIGHT PERSONS INDITED FOR PIRACY 6 (Boston, B. Green 1718), 
microformed on Early American Imprints, Series I No. 2003 (Readex).
161. THE TRYAL OF CAPTAIN THOMAS GREEN AND HIS CREW 47–48 (Edinburgh, An-
drew Anderson 1705).
162. 1 THE LAWS, ORDINANCES AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE ADMIRALTY OF GREAT 
BRITAIN, CIVIL AND MILITARY 225 (London, 1746).
An unusually lenient, minority view on piracy and summary violence was issued in 1676 
by Richard Lloyd, judge of admiralty in England, in a legal opinion for the Lords of Trades 
and Plantations concerning the trial of a pirate in Jamaica. In the course of discussing the ju-
risdiction of colonial admiralty courts, Lloyd wrote: “True it is that pirates and sea-rovers are, 
in the eye of the law, hostes humani generis; they are diffidati outlawed, as I may say, and out 
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In addition to legal officials of the crown, “[m]ost legal commenta-
tors . . . thought that summary justice, in the form of immediate hanging 
from the yardarm, could be meted out quite legally to pirates caught red-
handed, if there was no legal forum readily available to try them.”163 Ac-
cording to Charles Viner, the lawyer who endowed the chair at Oxford later 
held by Blackstone, wrote, in a paraphrase of Molloy:
If piracy be committed on the ocean, and the pirates in the attempt 
there happen to [be] overcome, the captors are not obliged to bring 
them to any port, but may expose them immediately to punishment, 
and hang them up at the main-yard end . . . for the old natural liber-
ty remains in places where there are no judgment.164
Many other legal authorities made the same points,165 as did lay au-
thors.166
of the protection of the law of nations; every man is commissioned to seize and slay them, if 
they make opposition; but if they yield, or be taken, they are to be tried criminally according 
to the prescribed form, and the practice in such cases.” WILLIAM FORSYTH, CASES AND 
OPINIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, AND VARIOUS POINTS OF ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE
111, 112 (London, Stevens & Haynes 1869) (quoting Sir Richard Lloyd). The fact that this 
was an opinion for the Lords of Trades and Plantations is shown in CALENDAR OF STATE 
PAPERS: COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES, 1675–1676, at 432 (W. Noel Sains-
bury ed., London, HM’s Stationery Office 1893) (entry 993). The opinion in the Calendar of 
State Papers is a condensed summary and contains a typographical mistake (“stay” for 
“slay”). Lloyd’s reference to pirates being “diffidati outlawed” is obscure. Treating pirates as 
ancient outlaws was discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 148–153. Lloyd’s
use of diffidati may have come from a medieval legal treatise by Bartolus de Saxoferrato 
(1313–1357), which discussed piracy and used diffidati to state that pirates had “renounced”
the law and thus were outside the protection of the law. See HEEBØLL-HOLM, supra note 39, at 
13 (quoting the text of Bartolus).
163. DURSTON, supra note 41, at 25; see also MARGARETTE LINCOLN, BRITISH PIRATES 
AND SOCIETY, 1680–1730, at 65 (2014) (“Those [pirates] captured on the open sea, remote 
from any port that could sustain due legal process, could, according to marine law, be imme-
diately put to death by hanging at the captor’s main yard.”).
164. 16 CHARLES VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 346 (2d ed., 
London, 1793) (italicization and capitalization in original omitted).
165. See, e.g., JUSTICE, supra note 156, at 477 (“Captors are not obliged to bring the Pi-
rates they take on the Ocean to any Port, but may Punish them immediately, by hanging them 
up at the Main-Yard end.”); A DISCOURSE OF THE LAWS RELATING TO PIRATES AND 
PIRACIES AND THE MARINE AFFAIRS OF GREAT BRITAIN, supra note 134, at 4–5 (“[I]n our 
Law Books they [pirates] are term’d Brutes and Beasts of Prey; and it is allowed to be lawful 
for those who take them, to put them to Death, if they cannot, with Safety to themselves, bring 
them under some Government to be try’d.”); 2 A GENERAL TREATISE OF NAVAL TRADE AND 
COMMERCE, AS FOUNDED ON THE LAWS AND STATUTES OF THE REALM 255 (The Savoy, E. 
& R. Nutt, & R. Gosling 1739) (“If Piracy be attempted on the Ocean, and the Pirates are van-
quished, the Captors may in such Case immediately inflict a Punishment, by hanging them up 
at the Main-Yard End, and they are not obliged to bring them to any Port; but this understood 
only on Places where no legal Judgment can be obtained.”); GILES JACOB, LEX MERCATORIA
188 (2d ed., The Savoy, E. & R. Nutt, & R. Gosling 1729) (same) [hereinafter LEX 
MERCATORIA]; GILES JACOB, A NEW LAW-DICTIONARY [hereinafter JACOB, DICTIONARY]
(8th ed., London, H. Woodfall & H. Strahan 1762) (“Piracy”: “If Piracy attempted on the 
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Molloy’s canonical views on summary execution of pirates were quoted 
and endorsed in a House of Commons debate in 1699, concerning the pro-
priety of a royal commission granting the right to take property from sus-
pected pirates without a judicial finding of guilt. To help show that judicial 
condemnation was not needed for pirates’ property to pass by the king’s
grant, Sir William Cowper, member of Parliament and king’s counsel, ar-
gued: “Question, who may take, and destroy a pirate. Any one, tho not 
commissioned by the prince and may hang him at the yard arm, says the 
booke de jure maritime et navali” by Molloy.167 If death could be imposed 
without trial, so could property transfer. Sir Edward Harley reiterated the 
same point, paraphrasing Molloy.168 No speaker disagreed, and the motion 
to condemn as illegal the king’s commission failed.169
The analogy to ancient outlawry is instructive on the policy reasons for 
the rule that pirates could be summarily killed on the high seas. Outlawry 
was needed at a time when the modern state did not exist and law enforce-
ment resources were almost nonexistent.170 A powerful tool was needed to 
prod accused offenders to voluntarily submit to the judicial system. The 
threat of execution on sight (if outlawed) was that tool. Even as the English 
state developed in size and capacity on land, and the rules about outlawry 
were reformed, the high seas remained a vast, unpoliced, and essentially 
lawless place. The allowance of military assault on suspected pirates and 
summary execution of captured pirates were the blunt but effective tools 
that the law deployed in that domain. In addition, we must remember that, in 
Ocean, if the Pirates are overcome, the Takers may immediately inflict a Punishment, by 
hanging them up at the Main-yard End; though this is understood where no legal Judgment 
may be maintained.”); 1 ANDREW MACDOWELL BANKTON, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF 
SCOTLAND IN CIVIL RIGHTS 528 (Edinburgh, R. Fleming 1751) (“Where piracy is committed 
in the ocean, and the pirates, in the attempt, happen to be overcome, the captors are not 
obliged to bring those beasts of prey to any port, but may expose them immediately to pun-
ishment, by hanging them up at the main yard end; for the natural liberty remains in places 
where there are no judicatures.”).
166. See, e.g., COTTON MATHER, INSTRUCTIONS TO THE LIVING, FROM THE CONDITION 
OF THE DEAD 17 (Boston, John Allen 1717) (delivering a funeral oration about hanged pirates 
and stating “[a]ll Nations agree, to treat your Tribe, as the Common Enemies of Mankind, and 
Extirpate them out of the World”); NEWS FROM THE SEA OR, THE TAKING OF THE CRUEL 
PIRATE 1 (London, 1674) (“[I]n all Ages they [pirates] have been esteemed, Humani Generis 
hostes, Publique Enemies to Mankind whom every one was obliged to oppose and destroy, as 
we do Common vermine that Infest and trouble us.”).
167. 2 PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE BRITISH PARLIAMENTS RESPECTING 
NORTH AMERICA, 1689–1702, at 327 (Leo Francis Stock ed., 1927) (statement of William 
Cowper on Dec. 6, 1699).
168. Id. at 331 (“A pirate is hostis humani generis. By the law of nations every man, 
without a commission from any prince is impowered to take and destroy him; and may hang 
him at the yard arm. He may execute such beasts of prey immediately without any solemnity 
of condemnation.”) (statement of Edward Harley on Dec. 6, 1699).
169. See id. at 316 (motion), 336 (vote).
170. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 149, at 502.
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the age of sail, a seaborne journey could last many months. It would be ex-
tremely dangerous to keep captured pirates on board a vessel for that length 
of time. And a ship’s limited stores of water and food could be depleted if it 
operated for a lengthy period as a floating jail for a captured pirate crew. 
Understanding this context helps explain legal rules that might otherwise 
seem barbaric.
2. Legal Authorization for Killing Pirates
Consistent with the view that pirates on the seas were men outside the 
protection of international and domestic law, and therefore could and should 
be extirpated like wild beasts, a myriad of legal authorities—statutes of Par-
liament, colonial charters, royal proclamations, royal commissions, patents, 
and other instructions directed to naval and other executive officials—
directly or indirectly authorized the extrajudicial killing of pirates.
A statute of Parliament creating articles of war to govern the Royal Na-
vy made it a capital crime, triable by court martial, for a naval captain or of-
ficer in “any fight or engagement” with “the Enemy Pirate or Rebells” to 
fail to “do his utmost to take fire[,] kill[,] and endamage” the opponents.171
Formal crown instructions to naval officers and other commanders fur-
ther evidence the direction of lethal force against pirates and the lack of le-
gal concern with killing them—though it was also frequently noted that cap-
tured pirates should be brought to trial. A commission issued by Henry VIII 
in 1511 instructed the captain to use warships “to seize and subdue all and 
singular such spoilers, pirates, exiles, and outlaws, wheresoever they shall 
from time to time be found; and, if they cannot otherwise be seized, to de-
stroy them,” with the prisoners delivered to commissioners of the Admiral-
ty.172 Elizabeth I in 1572 authorized the Lord High Admiral to seize pirates 
infesting the “seas or rivers of this jurisdiction of the Admiraltye” so they 
could be “tried and proved by justice and lawe,” but notes that “by fightinge 
with them any one or mo[r]e of them maye happen to be maymed, hurte, or 
slaine for their resistance.”173 In 1577, Elizabeth issued a warrant to the war-
den of the Cinque Ports noting the problem of “pyrats and sea rovers haunt-
171. 13 Car. 2 c. 9, § 12 (1661). These articles were based on an interregnum statute that 
had been drafted by the judges of Admiralty, and amended only slightly by Parliament, and so 
reflected expert opinion about the state of the law. See Reginald Acland, The Naval Articles of 
War, 3 J. COMP. LEG. & INT’L L. 190, 195–98 (1921). The 1661 articles quoted above were in 
force until 1749, when the entire set of articles were amended and re-enacted by Parliament. 
See id. at 198–200 (noting the substantive amendments between 1661 and 1749). The specific 
references to fighting and killing pirates, enemies, and rebels were replaced by directions that 
an officer must do his “utmost to take or destroy every Ship which it shall be his Duty to en-
gage.” 18 Geo. 2 c. 33, § 12 (1744). Pirates were mentioned in two articles, requiring naval 
officers to chase them vigorously and refrain from cowardly surrender to them. Id. §§ 13, 15.
172. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA, supra note 144, at
146, 147 (appointing John Hopton to command a squadron against pirates).
173. Id. at 191, 194–95.
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ing . . . the narrow seas and streames thereof,” and directing him to “arme 
and sett fourth . . . shippes furnished with maryners, souldiers, gonners, and 
other persons . . . to purge and clear the sea coasts of such evill persons.”174
James I in 1609 authorized the High Admiral to issue commissions of admi-
ralty to masters and commanders of armed vessels to seize “pyraticall 
ships,” their men being “committed to safe custodie . . . [to] suffer the payne 
of our lawes for their pyracie,” but noted that it may “soe fall out that by 
fighting with them any one or more of them may be maymed, hurte, or 
slayne.”175
In 1684, Charles II authorized a captain sailing for the Royal African 
Company to “seize and destroy all such pyrates, freebooters, and sea rovers, 
which he shall meet” within the geographic limits of the company’s char-
ter.176 That same year, Charles II wrote to the governor and magistrates of 
Massachusetts Bay colony, stating:
In consequence of the ravages of pirates in the territory of the King 
of Spain, we have thought it fit, for the encouragement of the amity 
that exists between us and his Spanish Majesty, to give orders for 
the suppression of pirates, and that you give no succour nor assis-
tance to any, and especially not to one called Thomas Pain, who, 
with five vessels under the command of Captain Breha, has lately 
sailed to Florida. Such pirates you will exterminate, so far as in you 
lies, as a race of evildoers and enemies of mankind.177
In 1686, the lieutenant governor of the colony of Jamaica issued written 
orders to a Royal Navy captain to cruise to “the Gulf of Samana . . . where 
Banister, the pirate may be expected to be found, and search all likely places 
for him, destroying all pirates.”178 Similar directions were given to other na-
val captains based at that colony.179 In 1688, James II proclaimed that pirates 
who surrendered would receive a pardon for past crimes but those who do 
not “shall be pursued with the utmost Severity, and with the greatest Rigour 
that may be, until they and every of them be utterly Suppressed and De-
174. Id. at 216, 216–17. The Cinque Ports were seacoast towns in Kent and Sussex.
175. Id. at 377, 377–78.
176. Id. at 112–13.
177. CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS: COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES,
1681–85, at 617–18 (J.W. Fortescue ed., London, Eyre & Spottiswood 1898) (entry 1634).
178. CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS: COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES,
1685–88, at 186 (J.W. Fortescue ed., London, HM’s Stationery Office 1899) (entry 661).
179. See id. at 160 (directing the captain to take two Royal Naval vessels to find a pirate 
“and endeavour to take or destroy him”) (entry 598); id. at 419 (“Ordering him to sail to Prov-
idence to take the pirate Woollerly, and thence to Havanna to demand the surrender of the 
pirate Bear, or failing that, to seek him out and destroy him.”) (entry 1405).
418 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:385
stroyed.”180 He previously authorized Robert Holmes, in command of a na-
val fleet, to suppress piracy in the Americas either “by force” or by offering 
individual pardons.181
In 1698, the Council of Trades and Plantations (later the Board of 
Trade) advised the Privy Council that a Captain Warren, leading a naval 
squadron to the East Indies, should be granted power “to seize on the per-
sons, ships and goods of the pirates, and in case of resistance to pursue and 
destroy or take them by land or sea . . . . Any pirates who will not voluntari-
ly submit must be attacked by land or sea, their persons, ships, etc., and 
their fortifications and refuges destroyed.”182 Later in 1698, the governor of 
the Bahamas commissioned the captain of an armed vessel to apprehend and 
deliver up “the notorious pirate Kelly,” “or in any ways to destroy him.”183
Authorization to kill pirates on sight continued to issue into the eight-
eenth century. In 1700, the Council of Virginia offered a reward “for the 
apprehension or killing of any pirate.”184 In 1701, the new governor of the 
Bahamas commissioned a fighting ship to “seize and destroy all pirates.”185
Admiralty instructions to Royal Navy captains early in the century directed 
them to “use your best endeavours to take, burn, sink, or otherwise destroy”
pirate vessels.186 And in 1753, the Admiralty instructed a Royal Navy cap-
tain dispatched to Africa that he should seek out pirates and use his “utmost 
endeavours to take or destroy them.”187
Colonial charters for American settlements offer additional evidence 
that pirates could lawfully be exterminated. A number of colonial charters, 
such as the 1663 charter for the colony of Carolina (granted by Charles II), 
contained a clause authorizing the proprietor, in order to protect against 
“sa[]vages . . . other enemies, pirates, and robbers,” to
make war and pursue the enemies and robbers aforesaid, as well by 
sea as by land, yea, even without the limits of the said province, 
and by God’s assistance to vanquish and take them, and being tak-
180. King James II, A Proclamation for the More Effectual Reducing and Suppressing of 
Pirates and Privateers in America (Jan. 20, 1688), in BRITISH ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS 
RELATING TO AMERICA, 1603–1783, at 140, 142 (Clarence S. Brigham ed., 1911).
181. Id. at 140–41.
182. CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS: COLONIAL, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES, 27
OCTOBER 1697–31 DECEMBER 1698, at 410–11 (J.W. Fortescue ed., 1905) (entry 788).
183. CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS: COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES,
1699, at 53 (Cecil Headlam ed., 1908) (entry 82-I).
184. CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS: COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES,
1700, at 239 (Cecil Headlam ed., 1910) (entry 405).
185. CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS: COLONIAL SERIES, AMERICA AND WEST INDIES,
JAN.–DEC. 1, 1701, at 17 (Cecil Headlam ed., 1912) (entry 25 vi).
186. PETER EARLE, THE PIRATE WARS 185–86 (2003).
187. THE BARRINGTON PAPERS 99–109 (D. Bonner-Smith ed., 1937).
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en, to put them to death by the law of war, or to save them at their 
pleasure.188
Other colonial charters for the Americas did not list pirates specifically, but 
authorized the government to
encounter, expulse, expell and resist, by force of armes, as well by 
sea as by lande, and also to kill, slay and destroy, by all fitting 
wayes . . . all and every such person and persons as shall, at any 
tyme hereafter, attempt or enterprize the destruction, invasion, det-
riment or annoyance of the said inhabitants.189
Another common provision in charters stated that those committing 
robberies and other acts of hostility on sea or land would be given a chance 
to make restitution and, if they did not, declared “out of our [the king’s] Al-
legiance and Protection; And that it shall be lawful and free, for all Princes, 
and others to pursue with hostility the said offender.”190
Colonial officers received instructions regarding pirates that were simi-
lar to the message of the 1661 articles of war governing the Royal Navy. 
For instance, a 1693 act of the province of New York directed government 
officers who learned of the presence of “pyrates” to raise “well Armed 
Men” to seize and jail the pirates, “and in case of any Resistance, or refusal 
to yield Obedience to their Majesties Authority, it shall be lawful to Kill or 
Destroy such Person or Persons.”191
In sum, the law of nations and English domestic law allowed the Eng-
lish government and private persons to summarily kill pirates encountered 
on the high seas, and the Crown and Parliament deployed that legal authori-
ty by repeatedly ordering or authorizing the killing of pirates. But many le-
gal authorities suggested that criminal process—rather than extrajudicial 
killing—was required if pirates were seized on or near English shores, with-
in easy reach of due process. In practice, the English government did fre-
quently try rather than summarily kill captured pirates. In those trials, a jury 
was used if the trial occurred under the statutes of Henry VIII, while a 
bench trial only was available if trial occurred on shipboard or in the colo-
nies under the statute of William III. Both modes of proceeding were con-
sidered lawful.
188. KING CHARLES II, CHARTER OF CAROLINA para. 15 (1663); accord KING CHARLES 
I, CHARTER OF MARYLAND para. 12 (1632); KING CHARLES II, CHARTER OF PENNSYLVANIA
para. 14 (1681).
189. KING CHARLES II, CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATION
para. 8 (1663).
190. KING JAMES I, CHARTER OF VIRGINIA para. 16 (1606); accord KING CHARLES II,
CHARTER OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATION para. 9 (1663); KING CHARLES 
II, CHARTER OF CONNECTICUT para. 7 (1662).
191. PROVINCE OF NEW-YORK, AN ACT FOR RESTRAINING AND PUNISHING 
PRIVATEERS AND PYRATES 3 (1693), microformed on Early American Imprints, Series I No. 
834 (Readex).
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II.  Explaining England’s Widespread Use of 
Criminal Trials for Pirates
Notwithstanding the clarity with which the law of nations and English 
domestic law allowed the killing of pirates encountered on the high seas—
as well as those who resisted apprehension, wherever located—in practice, 
many pirates were captured and transported to criminal trial, either at Admi-
ralty Sessions in England or in specially-constituted colonial vice-admiralty 
courts. What explains this observed practice, if not a view of global due 
process?
Although some factors favoring a criminal justice approach to piracy 
were always present, other factors depended on the historical era. Generally 
speaking, in earlier English history, the state was weak and the English gov-
ernment did not always view piracy negatively. In fact, important govern-
ment officials, including, at times, the monarch, supported pirates in some 
circumstances as a source of revenue and a cost-effective way to harass en-
emies. As the central English state matured, it came to view piracy as an 
unmitigated evil. Protection of lawful commerce, under the aegis of a globe-
spanning Royal Navy, demanded the extirpation of piracy. Colonials in the 
Americas took a long time to fall into line. It was only when London was 
able to exert effective control over colonial government that official tolera-
tion of piracy by some colonial officials was finally stamped out. There is 
no bright line in time between these two eras. I have made a rough division 
according to the monarchical houses that sat on the English throne.
A. The Tudor and Stuart Eras (circa 1485 to 1688)
There were a myriad of factors supporting a primarily law enforcement 
approach to piracy suppression. Domestic law played a role, but a narrower 
one than Chapman suggests. Many suspected pirates were captured on 
land.192 In the pre-modern era, the English navy was not large, except during 
wartime. But in wartime, the navy was busy with its military enemies. The 
geographic area over which pirates operated was vast, making it inherently 
difficult to find and detain pirates on the high seas.193 So naval captures on 
the high seas could not have been a large percentage of total captures of pi-
rates. And, of course, English law understood that alleged criminals cap-
tured on land in England or in English colonies were entitled to trial with 
due process according to the standing laws of the land. This obvious and 
uncontroversial rule explains many piracy trials.
192. See, e.g., ROBERT C. RITCHIE, CAPTAIN KIDD AND THE WAR AGAINST THE 
PIRATES 181–82 (1986) (capturing Captain William Kidd on land); DURSTON, supra note 41,
at 203 (arresting pirate Philip Roche on land); 2 BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE:
HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION, 1660–1730, at 289–90 (Joel Baer ed., 2007) [hereinafter 
BRITISH PIRACY] (catching seven pirates on land); id. at 1–2 (capturing pirate Charles Vane 
captured on land).
193. EARLE, supra note 186, at 183–84.
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Moreover, English pirates often worked just off the coast, rather than 
ranging more widely afield.194 If a suspected pirate or other criminal was 
captured near the seacoast of England or an English colony, and thus within 
easy reach of the criminal justice system, a number of authorities held that 
the law required disposition via criminal trial.195 English monarchs claimed 
territorial jurisdiction over the surrounding “British Seas,”196 and so criminal 
trials for pirates captured on the waters around England could likely be 
viewed as “domestic.” Disposition of these accused pirates via the criminal 
justice system197 thus would not provide evidence for Chapman’s claim that 
due process was understood to be truly global.
But many pirates captured on the high seas were also processed through 
criminal courts rather than being killed in combat or summarily executed 
after capture. One modern commentator offers that it was “very rare” for 
captured English pirates to be summarily executed by the government.198
That seems correct based on my research. The intentional killing of pirates 
in combat actions, when capture might well have been possible if different 
tactics were used, seems, however, to have been common.
We must ask why the legal right of summary execution was so rarely 
exercised and why the English government used the criminal justice system 
as a first-order tool for dealing with captured pirates. There were many rea-
sons sounding in policy, culture, morality, and law why the government pre-
ferred the criminal justice system to handle suspected pirates. Chapman’s
global due process view was not among those reasons, however. As a gen-
eral matter, it is not sound to assume that a sense of legal compulsion must 
have been the cause when we observe the government treating persons with 
fairness or mercy. There are many non-legal reasons to treat other human 
beings with fairness and mercy. Piracy suppression by the English govern-
ment provides a useful example of this.
For hundreds of years, there was a complex and ambivalent relationship 
between pirates and the English state. Coming out of the medieval period, 
the seas were still a largely lawless place, and it was unclear whether rob-
bing foreigners on the high seas was actually illegal.199 Even after the Eng-
lish state matured and began to define piracy against foreigners (and Eng-
194. See, e.g., N.A.M. RODGER, THE SAFEGUARD OF THE SEA: A NAVAL HISTORY OF 
BRITAIN, 660–1649, at 348 (1997); DAVID CHILDS, TUDOR SEA POWER: FOUNDATION OF 
GREATNESS 184 (2009).
195. See sources cited supra notes 163–165.
196. RUBIN, supra note 144, at 96, 103; THOMAS WEMYSS FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY 
OF THE SEA: AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE CLAIMS OF ENGLAND TO THE DOMINION OF 
THE BRITISH SEAS 18–20 (1911).
197. DURSTON, supra note 41, at 200 (“In the first century or so of the [Admiralty] ses-
sions’ existence most cases [of piracy] originated in waters immediately around the British 
Isles.”).
198. Id. at 25.
199. See RODGER, supra note 194, at 79, 115–16.
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lishmen) as a crime, it was still openly practiced by the English, especially 
against foreign victims who were not co-religionists, and often with either 
the tacit permission or active support of English government officials.200
Francis Drake’s blatant and extraordinarily lucrative piracy against the 
Spanish, for example, was supported by Queen Elizabeth and some highly-
placed officials.201 Throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, 
members of the Privy Council, judges of the Admiralty court, and many 
other officials in England invested in and otherwise profited from piracy.
Government officials in the overseas colonies, using distance to their ad-
vantage, supported pirates to a greater degree, even into the eighteenth cen-
tury when the main English state turned decisively against it.202 Piracy 
against English targets was frowned upon, however, and often harshly pun-
ished by the government.203
There was also a fine line between piracy and privateering.204 The latter 
was the practice, during war, of the government giving commissions to pri-
vate parties to outfit men-of-war to prey on the seaborne commerce of the 
enemy.205 This was piracy if there were no government license. Privateers 
often exceeded their commissions, however, by seizing neutral or friendly 
shipping too.206 And the English often took the controversial position that 
peace in Europe did not apply “beyond the line” in the Spanish West Indies, 
allegedly making privateering lawful there at all times. In addition to licens-
ing this private sea raiding, England extensively used pirates and privateers 
to supplement its naval fleets during wartime.207 Private armed ships were 
pivotal to the repulse of the Spanish Armada in 1588.208
Thus, “pirates” were not a unified category of men, and were certainly 
not all considered the “enemies of the human race,” as described by legal 
commentators. In fact, many individuals who committed acts that modern 
minds would consider barbaric, brute piracy were among the richest and 
most respected English gentlemen in their communities.209
200. See HANNA, supra note 27, at 10–11; RODGER, supra note 194, at 147–48, 182, 
195, 199–200, 343–45.
201. See HANNA, supra note 27, at 40–44; RODGER, supra note 194, at 243–45.
202. See, e.g., HANNA, supra note 27, at 40, 55, 65–66, 145–57, 217–20, 237–39; 
RITCHIE, supra note 192, at 12–14, 38; RODGER, supra note 194, at 347–49.
203. See HANNA, supra note 27, at 48–49.
204. See, e.g., Benton, supra note 29, at 706–13.
205. DURSTON, supra note 41, at 204–05; RODGER, supra note 194, at 199–200.
206. DURSTON, supra note 41, at 206–07; RODGER, supra note 194, at 199; Benton, su-
pra note 29, at 706–13.
207. See, e.g., JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH 
STATE, 1688–1783, at 10–11 (1988); HANNA, supra note 27, at 40, 112–16, 123, 214, 225, 
245; RITCHIE, supra note 192, at 16, 29–30.
208. See HANNA, supra note 27, at 40.
209. See RODGER, supra note 194, at 343–45.
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Given the ambivalent views about pirates held by the government and 
population for hundreds of years, it made sense to process captured pirates 
through the criminal justice system rather than slaughtering them outright at 
the point of capture. Piracy was a capital crime, without the benefit of cler-
gy.210 It was mostly Englishmen who were tried for piracy in English courts, 
so these were co-nationals at least, and sometimes even friends and neigh-
bors of the magistrates, judges, and jurors. Public opinion would have want-
ed guilt to be fairly determined before the ultimate penalty of death was im-
posed. Using the criminal justice system also allowed exercises of discretion 
in favor of mercy for those pirates whose actions were considered perhaps 
technically illegal but not wrongful by the government or the local popula-
tion. Juries could, and often did, refuse to convict.211 Judges could release an 
accused for a variety of legal reasons. The crown could pardon. If pirates 
were summarily destroyed by their captors, none of this discretion would 
have been possible.
When foreign nationals committed piracies, diplomatic considerations 
came to the fore. For reasons of state, English monarchs often preferred to 
treat foreign pirates mildly—using a catch and release policy, with notice to 
the foreign sovereign so as to reap diplomatic benefits.212 If punishment of 
the foreign pirate was deemed necessary, word could be sent to his home 
government that he would be treated fairly, and niceties arranged for the de-
tainee, such as bail under the care of his sovereign’s diplomat in England.213
None of this centralized policy calibration would have been possible if pi-
rates were summarily executed in lieu of capture.
In addition, pirates were tough and skilled mariners and thus very useful 
men. A historian dubbed English piracy based in the West Country “the 
School of English Seamen.”214 Oftentimes, pirates had formerly sailed on 
behalf of England, either in the naval service, as privateers during wartime, 
or against foreign pirates, and might do so again. Thus the crown could give 
royal pardons to pirates on the condition, or at least with the hope, that they 
would choose to serve the state.215 This could only happen if accused pirates 
210. Offenses at Sea Act of 1536, 28 Hen. 8 c. 15, § 3; see also DURSTON, supra note 
41, at 15–19 (discussing this fact).
211. DURSTON, supra note 41, at 113–15.
212. See, e.g., Letter from Henry VIII to Stephen Gardiner (Oct. 5, 1537), in [12 Part 2] 
LETTERS AND PAPERS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, OF THE REIGN OF HENRY VIII, supra note 
82, at 292, 293 (1891) (entry 832).
213. See, e.g., [12 Part 1] LETTERS AND PAPERS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, OF THE 
REIGN OF HENRY VIII, supra note 82, at 390 (entry 866).
214. See HANNA, supra note 27, at 49.
215. See id. at 16, 45, 49, 54 n.58, 126, 158. For an example of a monarch seeking to 
turn pirates into sailors of the Royal Navy, see King Edward VI, Ordering Arrest of Irish Pi-
rates (Jan. 1549), in 1 TUDOR ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS 437, 437 (Paul L. Hughes & James 
Francis Larkin eds., 1964) (stating that “the honest mariners, soldiers, and others” who served 
as pirate crews would be pardoned if they turned themselves in to the Admiral or the Lord 
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were proceeded against via the criminal justice system rather than killed ex-
trajudicially on the high seas.
Financial incentives might also have provided some motivation for 
crown officials to prefer a criminal justice approach to piracy. Convicted 
pirates suffered death with no benefit of clergy, and their lands and goods 
were forfeit.216 The Lord High Admiral received as personal income these 
forfeitures and any fines from criminal convictions of pirates.217 At first the 
admiral, and then later the crown, received convicted pirates’ property, as 
well as any property stolen by pirates that was not claimed by victims.218
Treaties provided another reason to resort to courts of law to punish 
non-English pirates captured on the seas. In a 1654 treaty, for instance, Eng-
land and Sweden promised that neither “the subjects of either state,” nor 
“their ships or effects” would be arrested except “according to due form of 
law.”219 This appeared in treaties with other countries as well.220 Treaties 
promised that subjects of each nation would have access to the courts of the 
other, and that justice under law would be done to them.221 In bilateral trea-
ties, England also promised to bring its nationals who engaged in piracy to 
justice.222 Other English treaties promised that naval commanders “will not 
molest or injure the subjects” of the other nation, and “if they shall do oth-
erwise, they shall be liable to answer for it in their persons and estates, and 
shall therein stand bound until just satisfaction and compensation shall be 
made.”223
Deputy of Ireland, and “as many of them as be willing to serve shall be received into wages 
and serve in his highness’ ships.”).
216. See VINER, supra note 164, at 352; HALE, supra note 116, at 354; AN ABRIDGMENT 
OF SEVERAL ACTS AND CLAUSES OF ACTS OF PARLIAMENT, RELATING TO THE TRADE AND 
NAVIGATION OF GREAT BRITAIN 22, 24 (London, John Baskett 1739).
217. See DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA, supra note 
144, at 370, 444–45; 1 THE POPULAR ENCYCLOPEDIA 35 (Glasgow, Blackie & Son 1841).
218. VINER, supra note 164, at 349.
219. Treaty of Peace and Amity, Eng.-Swed., art. 5, Apr. 11, 1654, 3 Consol. T.S. 257.
220. Treaty of Peace and Commerce, Eng.-Den., art. 26, July 11, 1670, 11 Consol. T.S. 
1670.
221. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Eng.-Spain, arts. 1, 23, May 13, 1667, 10 Consol. 
T.S. 63. To the same effect, see Treaty of Commerce, Eng.-Neth., art. 15, Feb. 17, 1668, 10 
Consol. T.S. 441. The 1667 treaty with Spain was applied to Sicily in 1713. Convention Re-
specting the Commerce of Sicily and Great Britain, Gr. Brit.-Savoy, para. 3, Mar. 8, 1713, 27 
Consol. T.S. 397. And the 1667 treaty was reaffirmed in 1715. See Treaty of Peace and Com-
merce, Gr. Brit.-Spain, art. 5, Dec. 14, 1715, 29 Consol. T.S. 369.
222. Treaty of Peace, Alliance, and Commerce, Eng.-Den., art. 19, Feb. 13, 1661, 6 
Consol. T.S. 233 (promising that each party “shall use means that the foresaid pirates and 
robbers, and their partners and abettors, may be apprehended, and suffer condign punish-
ment”). To the same effect, see Treaty of Peace and Commerce, supra note 220, art. 29; Trea-
ty of Peace and Friendship, supra note 221, art. 4; Treaty of Peace, Good Correspondence and 
Neutrality in America, Eng.-Fr., art. 14, Nov. 6, 1686, 18 Consol. T.S. 83.
223. Treaty of Peace and Commerce, supra note 220, art. 35. To the same effect, see 
Treaty of Commerce, supra note 221, art. 22; Treaty of Peace and Alliance, Eng.-Neth., art. 3, 
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Although these treaty promises were embodied in specific bilateral 
agreements, they also extended to England’s relations with other non-
signatory nations because of “most favored nation” clauses. An example of 
a typical most favored nation clause, in a bilateral treaty with Spain, prom-
ised that the subjects of each country would “enjoy . . . in all places whatso-
ever, the same privileges, securities, liberties, and immunities, whether they 
concern their persons or trade, with all the beneficial clauses and circum-
stances which have been granted, or shall hereafter be granted” by either 
monarch in other treaties.224 Thus England was bound to treat Spanish na-
tionals according to the highest level of liberties and immunities it had 
promised to the subjects of any other nation.
This web of treaty promises by England meant that international law 
and diplomatic considerations favored the use of criminal process for ac-
cused pirates in many instances, just as domestic policy considerations did 
also.
B. After the Glorious Revolution of 1688-89
Starting in the latter part of the seventeenth century, the English state 
grew in size, power, and expertise and came to understand that commerce 
rather than marauding was the key to national prosperity. Simultaneously, 
the central government started to clamp down on piracy and other kinds of 
privatized violence, even that directed against foreigners.225 The English na-
vy was greatly expanded at about the same time, and the government started 
to use it extensively to protect merchant shipping from pirates and foreign 
privateers.226 Using the criminal justice system as the mainstay of anti-
piracy efforts continued to make good sense under this new regime.
Piracy trials allowed the government to promote a deterrence objective 
by making an example of the convicted.227 Pirates convicted in England 
were, by tradition, hanged on the mudflats at Wapping, situated on the 
Thames a mile down river from the Tower of London. Hanging occurred 
between the high and low water marks, an area within the jurisdiction of the 
Admiralty. After death, the bodies were chained to a stake until the tide 
covered them three times. The bodies of notorious pirates were often then 
removed, covered with pitch or sometimes wrapped in chains to preserve 
the form of the body for a time. These bodies would be displayed publicly 
¶ 37, July 31, 1667, 10 Consol. T.S. 231; Treaty of Peace and Friendship, supra note 221, art. 
4; Treaty of Peace, Eng.-Fr., art. 16, Nov. 3, 1655, 4 Consol. T.S. 1; Treaty of Peace, Good 
Correspondence and Neutrality in America, supra note 222, arts. 11–12.
224. Treaty of Peace and Friendship, supra note 221, art. 38. To the same effect, see 
Treaty of Peace and Commerce, supra note 220, arts. 8, 40.
225. See, e.g., HANNA, supra note 27, at 222–50; RITCHIE, supra note 192, at 147–49.
226. See, e.g., RITCHIE, supra note 192, at 155–59.
227. See, e.g., HANNA, supra note 27, at 134 (noting English government awareness of 
the deterrent value of public executions of convicted pirates).
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on gibbets at various places on the coast to warn sailors about the conse-
quences of resorting to piracy.228 This was more effective publicity in the 
service of deterrence than it would be if pirates were killed on the high seas 
far from public notice.
The central English government also saw criminal trials, which would 
publicize the brutality of piracy, as a way to harden public perceptions 
against it and so enlist support in the anti-piracy campaign.229 Trials of pi-
rates were extensively covered in the press, and many books and pamphlets 
based on the testimony were published.230
Bringing state power to bear through the criminal justice system was 
understood to be a powerful way to send a message to foreign governments 
with whom England desired to maintain peaceful relations. Diplomats rep-
resenting foreign nations frequently complained to the English government 
about piratical attacks by Englishmen, and the Crown often responded by 
proclaiming that the perpetrators were pirates and directing vigorous efforts 
to try and execute them.231 Failing to punish English pirates criminally who 
attacked friendly foreigners would have been considered a serious breach of 
England’s duties under the law of nations.232 Thus, criminal prosecution was 
a potent diplomatic message.
Colonial officials also sent messages via criminal trials of accused pi-
rates. Once the central government began vigorously cracking down on co-
lonial governmental support of piracy, it became important for colonial 
leaders to show that the message was received. Colonial governors sent cap-
tured pirates back to England for trial as a visible sign to their superiors that 
they were taking vigorous action against the problem,233 or held and publi-
cized trials in their colony for the same purpose.234
Thus, during both periods of England’s relationship with piracy—an 
earlier period in which pirates were sometimes supported rather than pro-
scribed, and a later period in which piracy was unequivocally treated by the 
state as an outrage to be strictly suppressed—there were multiple reasons 
for the government to prefer a criminal justice approach. There is no basis, 
228. The foregoing paragraph is based on JOWITT, supra note 90, at 21–22; LINCOLN,
supra note 163, at 34–40; RITCHIE, supra note 192, at 1–2, 228.
229. See HANNA, supra note 27, at 11, 240–41.
230. Id. at 240–41. For examples of such pamphlets, books, and articles, see the docu-
ments reproduced in 1–4 BRITISH PIRACY, supra note 192.
231. See, e.g., HANNA, supra note 27, at 180, 239. For centuries, diplomatic correspond-
ence by English officials and by foreign diplomats concerning England is littered with foreign 
government complaints about pirates and English promises to find and punish them. See, e.g.,
Letter from Eustace Chapuys to Charles V (Jan. 30, 1532), in LETTERS AND PAPERS, FOREIGN 
AND DOMESTIC, OF THE REIGN OF HENRY VIII, supra note 82, at 362 (entry 762).
232. See generally Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and 
the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 478–81 (2011).
233. See, e.g., RITCHIE, supra note 192, at 159.
234. See, e.g., HANNA, supra note 27, at 120, 134.
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therefore, to assume that a view of global liberty under law must have been 
the causal driver for the observed phenomenon of widespread and preferen-
tial use of criminal law.
III.  The Law of the United States
Chapman argues that Americans inherited a concept of global due pro-
cess from England and embodied it in their Constitution, in the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. As discussed above, Chapman claims that 
English due process required that anyone, anywhere in the world, suspected 
of conduct that constituted a domestic crime must be proceeded only ac-
cording to the course of the common law and other standing law of the land, 
including trial by jury. The only deviation, Chapman claims, was that trial 
before the bench (rather than jury) was authorized during the reign of Wil-
liam III in admiralty courts held in the American colonies or other overseas 
locations. But, according to Chapman, Americans rejected this and reverted 
to the original, strict view of due process.
The previous sections show that there was no such view of global due 
process held by the English, at home or in the North American colonies. 
Thus, post-independence Americans could not have inherited anything of 
that sort. Instead, Americans inherited the view, based in international law 
and English domestic law, that pirates on the high seas were outside the pro-
tection of the law and could lawfully be killed, either in battle or by sum-
mary execution after capture.
Chapman is correct that England had a practice of trying many pirates 
captured on the seas in regular criminal courts, rather than summarily killing 
them. He is also correct that Americans continued this practice. The Consti-
tution authorized Congress to “define and punish piracies and felonies 
committed on the high seas,”235 and from the 1790 Crimes Act onward, the 
United States had a federal statutory crime of piracy.236 There were many 
federal court piracy prosecutions, of both American citizens and foreigners, 
during the Founding and Early Republic eras.237
But this observed practice, standing alone, is not evidence that Chap-
man’s view of due process existed. Americans, like the English, had many 
reasons based in policy, morality, expediency, international law, and inter-
national relations to use the criminal justice approach for pirates. We must 
see some direct evidence, then, showing that frequent resort to the criminal 
model was driven by legal understandings of due process of the type Chap-
man suggests. Chapman presents only one piece of evidence of this kind—
235. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
236. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14; see also Act of Mar. 3, 1819,
ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14.
237. See, e.g., DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS AND CRIMINALS: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801–1829 (1985).
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an 1822 report of a House of Representatives committee. As discussed be-
low, the report does not mean what Chapman thinks it does.
In theory, Americans might have accepted Chapman’s view even 
though their mother country rejected it. Many Americans had come to be-
lieve over the long decades of revolutionary ferment and constitution-
making that fundamental liberties, including the jury, should be inviolate. 
And there was an emerging notion in the founding era that governmental 
acts in violation of fundamental liberties were void, and might be declared 
so by the courts.238 The Americans’ written constitution guaranteed a jury in 
criminal cases, in Article III of the original, un-amended document.239 And 
the Bill of Rights added additional protection for the criminal jury and new 
protection for the grand jury and civil jury.240 But despite all this, the evi-
dence discussed below shows that Americans did not think that their new 
and improved version of due process required that pirates on the high seas 
be suppressed only with criminal trials. The only change from English prac-
tice was that Americans insisted that the jury must be used if criminal trials 
for piracy were to occur.
A. Background Understandings
The United States was not, of course, a legal blank slate when it de-
clared independence in 1776, much less in 1788, when the Constitution was 
adopted. New law was overlaid on the pre-existing British system, in which 
the new republic was nurtured. Thus, the English practice and law, dis-
cussed above, which treated pirates on the high seas as outside the protec-
tion of the law and subject to extrajudicial killing, was the system that the
United States inherited. A lot of the piracy occurred in and around the 
Americas, and thus colonial administrators in what would become the Unit-
ed States were involved in creating many of the precedents about the lawful 
extermination of pirates that were described above.241 Specific English legal 
authorities, which conveyed these legal understandings about pirates, were 
well known in America. Parliamentary statutes, royal proclamations, im-
portant decisions of the Privy Council, and other significant government 
documents were available in the United States. Legal treatises announcing 
the rule that pirates could be lawfully killed were also available to Ameri-
cans. We know that Molloy’s popular treatise, for example, was available 
because it was frequently cited in litigation in U.S. courts, including in the 
Supreme Court.242 Blackstone was an indispensable resource for American 
238. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 455 (2005).
239. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
240. Id. amends. V, VI, VII.
241. See, e.g., supra notes 158–160 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., McDonough v. Dannery, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 188, 198 (1796) (opinion of 
Cushing, J.); Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 38 (1800) (argument of counsel); Blaine v. 
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lawyers. The works of Viner, Hawkins, Hale, and Jacob’s law dictionary 
and Lex Mercatoria—all cited above—were also in wide use.243
Important indigenous American legal authorities reiterated the message 
that it was lawful to kill pirates on the high seas. For example, the influen-
tial treatises of James Kent and William Alexander Duer both stated that 
“[e]very nation has a right to attack and exterminate them [pirates] without 
any declaration of war.”244 Kent also wrote that a pirate “is reputed to be out 
of the protection of all laws and privileges.”245
Foreign writers who had significant influence on American law like-
wise taught that it was lawful to summarily kill pirates. Emer de Vattel, the 
Swiss authority on the law of nations, wrote that “the depredations of pi-
rates” are a kind of “illegitimate and informal war[],” justifying a captor in 
summarily hanging them.246 Jean Jacques Burlamaqui, another Swiss author 
who was widely consulted and cited in early America, wrote that pirates 
were an “enemy” whom anyone could “justly destroy.”247 The German jurist 
Samuel Pufendorf, following Grotius, wrote that “Pirates are not . . . lawful 
Enemies, but should be look’d on as the common Adversaries of Mankind,”
and since they operate in places (the high seas) “that are not subject to any 
determinate Court of Judicature,” not only may the government attack them 
under “the Right of War” but “every Man may draw his Sword against 
them.”248
Ship Charles Carter, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 328, 330 (1808) (argument of counsel); United States 
v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 155 (1820) (argument of the U.S. Attorney General).
243. See, e.g., United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 481 (1827) (citing 
HAWKINS, supra note 134, and HALE, supra note 116); United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 
Wheat.) 153, 159 n.4, 161 n.6, 163 n.8 (1820) (citing HAWKINS, supra note 134, and VINER,
supra note 164); Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 292, 328 (1815) (citing VINER,
supra note 164); M’Ilvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 280, 310 (1805) (argument of 
counsel citing HALE, supra note 116); Wilson v. Lenox, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 194, 210 (1803) 
(argument of counsel citing JACOB, DICTIONARY, supra note 165); Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 
Dall.) 133, 160 (1795) (Iredell, J., citing LEX MERCATORIA, supra note 165).
244. 1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 172 (New York, O. Halstead 
1826); WILLIAM ALEXANDER DUER, OUTLINES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
THE UNITED STATES 148 (New York, Collins & Hannay 1833).
245. KENT, supra note 244, at 174.
246. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 507–08 (Béla Kapossy & Richard 
Whatmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008) (1758). On Vattel’s influence in America, see Thomas H. 
Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 
NW. U. L. REV. 1027, 1061–67 (2002); Brian Richardson, The Use of Vattel in the American 
Law of Nations, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 547, 548 (2012).
247. JEAN JACQUES BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITIC LAW 274–75 (Petter 
Korkman ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Liberty Fund 2006) (1751). On the influence of Burla-
maqui in America, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 27–29 (50th anniversary ed. 2017); RAY FORREST HARVEY, JEAN JACQUES 
BURLAMAQUI: A LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 79–175 (1937).
248. SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, at bk. III p. 
220, bk. VIII pp. 168–69 (Oxford, L. Lichfield ed., 1703) (1672). On the influence of Pufen-
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In addition, the background understanding of a reciprocal link between 
allegiance and protection, and the way citizenship and territorial location 
interacted with that framework, was inherited in American law from Eng-
land.249 Thus, under U.S. law, noncitizens outside the country were pre-
sumptively outside the protections of domestic law, including the Constitu-
tion.250
B. American Government Practice
After the United States built a small navy in the late 1790s and early 
1800s,251 it was used extensively against pirates with apparently no ex-
pressed concern about the putative constitutional due process rights of those 
attacked. Some of these anti-pirate military actions may best be understood 
as war, and Chapman, along with most other globalist legal commentators,
concede that the Due Process Clause and other constitutional rights do not 
apply to foreign enemies during wartime.252 But to sustain his ambitious the-
sis, Chapman needs to show that the Due Process Clause was understood to 
limit the U.S. government’s choices—to prevent it from choosing to use vi-
olent measures such as military attack or summary execution on pirates, re-
quiring instead that a criminal justice model be deployed. Chapman has not 
shown this, and the historical record does not support it. This subsection ad-
dresses American government practice. Section V, which follows, will take 
up directly the question of war versus law enforcement and whether funda-
dorf on the American Founding generation, see MARK WESTON JANIS, AMERICA AND THE 
LAW OF NATIONS 1776–1939, at 24–25 (2010); BAILYN, supra note 247, at 27, 29, 43, 150.
249. See Hamburger, supra note 115, at 1844–47; Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 
7, at 499–505; Kent, Enemy Fighters, supra note 115, at 177.
250. See Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 485–505; Kent, Black Holes, supra
note 14, at 1036–37. This presumptive territoriality of fundamental legal protections co-
existed, however, with an openness of American institutions to common law trespass recovery 
when legal rights of citizens or noncitizens were invaded on the high seas or abroad. See Stat-
utory Piracy, 2 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen. 19, 21 (1825). A Marshall Court case cited by some com-
mentators to supposedly show that either common law actions against U.S. government offi-
cials were allowed for extraterritorial misconduct, or that the Constitution’s separation of 
powers framework operated extraterritorially, Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804), 
has been misread. The case concerned a kind of cross-claim allowed by the international law 
of prize when a captor prosecuting a libel suit in a prize court was found to have wrongfully 
detained a vessel. Application of the law of prize in federal courts occurred by implicit direc-
tion of the U.S. Constitution and statutes, not from a free-floating individual right under the 
common law or Constitution. On the proper reading of Barreme, see Kent, Citizenship, supra 
note 7, at 2119 n.14; Andrew Kent, Are Damages Different?: Bivens and National Security,
87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1165 n.184, 1191 n.280 (2014).
251. On the creation of the U.S. Navy, see JONATHAN R. DULL, AMERICAN NAVAL 
HISTORY, 1607–1865: OVERCOMING THE COLONIAL LEGACY (2012); IAN W. TOLL, SIX 
FRIGATES: THE EPIC HISTORY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE U.S. NAVY (2006); STEPHEN 
HOWARTH, TO SHINING SEA: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY, 1775–1998 (1999).
252. See, e.g., NEUMAN, supra note 25, at 110–11; Chapman, supra note 15, at 377, 
383–84.
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mental law constrained the government’s choice of which paradigm to em-
ploy.
1. Amelia Island, 1817
In 1817, the U.S. Navy cleared a “piratical establishment” from Amelia 
Island in Spanish Florida, because “numerous violations of our laws had 
been latterly committed by a combination of freebooters and smugglers of 
various nations.”253 The United States was doing law enforcement via (po-
tentially) lethal military force, something that Chapman claims was strictly 
prohibited by the Due Process Clause.254 President Monroe stated that the 
denizens of Amelia Island had made it “a channel for the illicit introduction 
of slaves from Africa into the United States, an asylum for fugitive slaves 
from the neighboring States, and a port for smuggling of every kind”255—all 
in violation of U.S. criminal statutes. The executive authorized the military 
that, “if it should be found indispensably necessary, force must be used” to 
clear out the pirate nest.256 The executive instructions and internal executive 
branch communications,257 notes of cabinet deliberations,258 and debates in 
Congress (primarily about the implications of the action at Amelia for U.S. 
relations with Spain and rebelling former-Spanish colonies)259 reveal no 
concern that due process was implicated in any of this.
2. Pirates in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, 1819-1828
Piracy plagued the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico during the second 
and third decades of the nineteenth century. Spanish colonies in the new 
world revolted in the first decade, claiming to be independent nations. These 
revolutionary governments issued commissions to privateers, which imme-
diately became a flimsy cover for piracy. Spain also licensed privateers in 
253. H.R. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SUPPRESSION OF PIRATICAL 
ESTABLISHMENTS, H.R. REP. NO. 15-290 (1st Sess. 1818), reprinted in 4 AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 132, 132–33 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Wash-
ington, Gales & Seaton 1834) (capitalization adjusted).
254. Chapman, supra note 15, at 381, 389, 405.
255. Message from President James Monroe to Congress (Dec. 2, 1817), in AMERICAN 
STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 130; see also Message from Presi-
dent James Monroe to Congress (Jan. 13, 1818), in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 139 (stating that Amelia Island was the site of illegal smug-
gling and privateering); H.R. REP. NO. 15-290, at 132, 133–34 (finding that it was the “duty”
of the United States to stop this activity in order to secure commerce, stop attacks on neutral 
shipping, and prevent violations of the United States’ “revenue and prohibitory laws.”).
256. AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 141; see also
id. at 143 (authorizing the use of force to clear the pirates and smugglers from Amelia Island).
257. See AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 139–44.
258. See 4 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 14–16, 20–21, 28–29 (Charles Francis 
Adams ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1875).
259. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 403–04, 409–16 (1817); id. at 646–50 (1818).
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response. The breakdown of political and social order—both a cause and a 
further effect of the revolutions—created a power vacuum which many 
plain old pirates, not claiming any veneer of legality, exploited. After the 
United States annexed Florida from Spain,260 the U.S. government became 
even more concerned than before about terminating the pirate threat. The 
fact that many U.S. citizens were engaging in either privateering-cum-
piracy or straightforward piracy made the government’s interest even 
stronger.261
Records of the Navy’s response to this piracy show repeated instances 
where life and property were taken with no semblance of judicial due pro-
cess. Given the openness with which this was all discussed, in official gov-
ernment documents, presidential statements, congressional debates, and 
newspapers, it seems inconceivable that any relevant actors subscribed to 
Chapman’s due process thesis—i.e., that no person, including noncitizens 
on the high seas or in foreign countries, who engaged in conduct made crim-
inal by an act of Congress could be proceeded against except via judicial 
process under the standing laws of the land.
Naval, congressional, and public attention were focused on the anti-
piracy campaigns when Captain David Porter—who was given the title 
commodore, put in command of the U.S. Navy’s West Indies squadron from 
1823–25, and charged with suppressing piracy—was arraigned on charges 
of misconduct in 1825. Porter had insulted Spanish officials at Puerto Rico 
whom he thought were conniving with pirates and was recalled to the Unit-
ed States and court-martialed. A contemporaneous naval court of inquiry 
also examined his overall record in the West Indies. Despite the review and 
publication of voluminous documents and testimony showing the life, limb, 
and property of suspected pirates being taken without any due process, nei-
ther the civilian executive branch, the naval courts, Congress, nor the public 
seemed to have any legal qualms.
Anti-pirate naval actions began before Porter arrived on the scene. Ap-
parently acting under the 1790 Crimes Act, which made piracy a federal 
crime, the U.S. Navy was attacking pirates in the Gulf of Mexico as early at 
1814. A naval commandant wrote to the Secretary of the Navy of his duty, 
260. The treaty was signed in 1819 and effective in 1821. See Treaty of Amity, Settle-
ment, and Limits, U.S.-Spain, Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 252.
261. For the history summarized in the preceding paragraph, see CAITLIN FITZ, OUR 
SISTER REPUBLICS: THE UNITED STATES IN AN AGE OF AMERICAN REVOLUTIONS (2017);
DAVID HEAD, PRIVATEERS OF THE AMERICAS: SPANISH AMERICAN PRIVATEERING FROM 
THE UNITED STATES IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (2015); JOHN CHARLES CHASTEEN,
AMERICANOS: LATIN AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE (2009); ARTHUR P.
WHITAKER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF LATIN AMERICA, 1800–1830
(1941); GARDNER W. ALLEN, OUR NAVY AND THE WEST INDIAN PIRATES (1929); FRANCIS 
B.C. BRADLEE, PIRACY IN THE WEST INDIES AND ITS SUPPRESSION (1923).
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in reference to an attack on pirates on the Louisiana coast, to “destroy or 
make prisoners of them and their leaders.”262
In 1819, as piracy grew in scale and violence, Congress responded with 
a two-pronged statute. On the one hand, there was a judicial due process ap-
proach. The crime of piracy was expanded somewhat, and the Navy was au-
thorized to seize and bring into port for condemnation via judicial process 
any vessels engaged in piracy.263 On the other hand, military force would be 
used to destroy pirates and their vessels. The statute “authorized and re-
quested” the president “to employ so many of the public armed vessels as, 
in his judgment, the service may require, with suitable instructions to the 
commanders thereof, in protecting the merchant vessels of the United States 
and their crews from piratical aggression and depredations.”264
As discussed below, under this authorization—which was renewed and 
supplemented in subsequent years265—the Navy killed many pirates, de-
stroyed many suspected pirate vessels, frequently destroyed what they be-
lieved to be pirate property on shore (including on Spanish soil), and 
brought large numbers of prisoners back to the United States for criminal 
trial. Since the Due Process Clause protects property as well as life and lib-
erty, both extrajudicial property destructions as well as killings of pirates are 
evidence against Chapman’s view.
In fall 1819, it was reported that two U.S. revenue cutters266 attacked pi-
rates off Louisiana and “the pirates lost six men killed. The remainder of her 
crew, to the number of eighteen, were safely lodged in prison . . . .”267 In 
November 1821, Lt. Lawrence Kearny, U.S. Navy, reported to the Secretary 
of the Navy that he, in command of U.S. Brig. Enterprise off Cape Antonio, 
Cuba, attacked pirates, captured one prisoner, and burned a captured “pirat-
262. Letter from Master Commandant Daniel T. Patterson to William Jones, Sec’y of the 
Navy (Sept. 10, 1814), as reprinted in JOSEPH GIBBS, ON THE ACCOUNT: PIRACY AND THE 
AMERICAS, 1766–1835, at 84, 86 (2012).
263. Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 78, §§ 2, 5, 3 Stat. 510, 512–14.
264. Id. § 2.
265. See Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 113, § 1, 3 Stat. 600 (extending the Act of 1819 for 
two years and then further until the end of the next session of Congress); Act of Jan. 30, 1823, 
ch. 7, 3 Stat. 721 (making permanent the Act of 1819); see also Act of Dec. 20, 1822, ch. 1, 3 
Stat. 720, §§ 1–2 (authorizing the president to fit out and deploy additional naval vessels “for 
the purpose of repressing piracy, and of affording effectual protection to the citizens and 
commerce of the United States in the Gulf of Mexico, and the seas and territories adjacent,”
and appropriating money for that purpose).
266. Revenue cutters were small sailing vessels designed for use near the coast to en-
force U.S. revenue laws. See generally Greg Shelton, Note, The United States Coast Guard’s
Law Enforcement Authority Under 14 U.S.C. § 89: Smugglers’ Blues or Boaters’ Nightmare?,
34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 939–41 (1993) (explaining the development of the revenue 
cutter service).
267. A Pirate Taken, HAMPDEN PATRIOT (Springfield, Mass.), Oct. 21, 1819, at 2, re-
printed in GIBBS, supra note 262, at 102, 103.
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ical Schooner[] . . . .”268 Two months later, Kearny was reported to have 
“captured a piratical boat off Cape Antonio, landed, and burnt their huts.”269
Also in January 1822, Lt. Ramage, commanding the Porpoise, reported to 
his superiors that he landed soldiers on Cuba in search of reported pirates 
who engaged the pirates in battle: “We took possession and burnt and de-
stroyed their fleet, consisting of five vessels . . . . We also took three prison-
ers; the others fled to the woods. In the affair just mentioned the officers of 
the expedition state that enemy’s loss to be severe.”270 Later that spring, a 
U.S. Navy captain wrote that, from a station off Cuba, “I have taken and de-
stroyed six piratical vessels, burnt two of their establishments, killed some 
of their people, and have now some prisoners on board.”271 As discussed be-
low,272 many members of Congress expressed in floor statements that mili-
tary force should be used to exterminate pirates, with no hint of hesitation 
based on domestic legal concerns.
Although pirates and privateers were based on Spanish-owned islands, 
including Cuba and Puerto Rico, and were understood to operate with the 
support of some local merchants and Spanish government officials, the 
United States was careful to respect Spanish sovereignty enough to avoid a 
war. After delaying making this move for several years, the executive in 
early 1823 authorized the Navy to enter Spanish territory to pursue pirates, 
but required naval commanders to announce to local authorities that their 
“sole object” was “aiding the local authorities” and “bring[ing] the offend-
ers to justice.”273 The Navy was instructed that, if it seized any pirates “on
land,” i.e., in Spanish territory, it must “deliver them over to the proper au-
thority to be dealt with according to law.”274 Nothing was said about the dis-
position of pirates captured on the high seas, suggesting that the mandated 
use of the criminal justice system in this instance was driven by concerns 
about international law and international relations, rather than any notion 
that due process was global. The Navy’s general orders went further, 
though, directing officers who captured suspected pirates to deliver them to 
appropriate U.S. or Spanish authorities, without regard to where the capture 
took place. 275
268. Letter from Lt. Lawrence Kearny to Thompson, Sec’y of the Navy, (Nov. 12, 
1821), reprinted in GIBBS, supra note 262, at 119.
269. News, REPUBLICAN CHRON. (Ithaca, N.Y.), Jan. 30, 1822, at 3.
270. BRADLEE, supra note 261, at 15, 16.
271. Pirates and Piracy, CITY GAZETTE & COM. DAILY ADVERT. (Charleston, S.C.), 
Apr. 3, 1822, at 2.
272. See infra Section V.C.
273. Instructions from Smith Thompson, Sec’y of the Navy, to Commodore David Por-
ter (Feb. 1, 1823), in 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS 502 (Ashbury Dick-
ins & James C. Allen eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1858).
274. Id.
275. See General Instructions for Officers Commanding Cruising Vessels, Navy De-
partment (C. 1823), IN MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY AND COURT 
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In practice, however, the Navy under Porter from 1823––25 was brutal. 
Porter testified to his understanding of the authority he had vis-à-vis pirates 
encountered by his squadron in language familiar from old English treatises 
and law dictionaries:
[P]irates are considered, by the laws of nations, the enemies of the 
human race; and this being the case, it is the duty of all nations to 
put them down . . . . [E]very pirate reduces himself to a state of na-
ture, and defies all laws, and may be punished . . . . at discretion, 
without any regard to law. . . . I offer the following quotation from 
the Lex Mercatoria [at page] 184: ‘A piracy is attempted on the 
ocean; if the pirates are overcome, the takers may immediately in-
flict a punishment by hanging them up at the main yard end, though 
this is understood when no legal judgment may be obtained.’276
Similarly, U.S. Navy (“USN”) Master Commandant Alexander Dallas testi-
fied that “[t]he particular object of this cruise was the destruction of all the 
pirates, and piratical establishments, as well on the ocean as on shore, as we 
could meet with.”277 And that is what happened.
In April 1823, Porter reported to the Secretary of the Navy that Lt. 
Stribling, commanding U.S. naval vessels off Cuba, “ran along side of her 
[the pirate vessel]” in a “sudden and effectual . . . attack,” and he “took pos-
session of her, after a fire of ten minutes, in which time, all the [pirate] 
crew, except the Captain and three others, one of whom is taken, were 
killed—the pirate having time to fire his long gun only once.”278 One month 
later, Porter wrote to the Secretary of the Navy quoting USN Captain Cas-
sin, who was also operating off Cuba, reporting “the capture of a piratical 
schooner and a very fine felucca; the destruction of one on shore, the burn-
ing of three schoolers in the Rio Palmas, and about a dozen of their [pi-
rates’] houses in the different establishments to leeward of Bahia Honda.”279
Also in May 1823, USN Lt. Watson wrote to Porter, reporting that off Sig-
MARTIAL IN RELATION TO CAPTAIN DAVID PORTER 183 (Washington, Davis & Force 1825) 
[hereinafter PORTER PROCEEDINGS] (“Whenever, therefore, you shall find any boats or ves-
sels, the crews whereof have committed any actual violence, outrage, or depredation, upon 
any vessels of the United States, or the citizens thereof . . . you will consider yourself author-
ized to subdue, seize, and taken them; and, unless on such capture, you shall be satisfied that 
they were acting under some lawful authority, and not piratically, to send them in for adjudi-
cation.”).
276. 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS 419, 423 (Asbury Dickins & John 
W. Forney eds., Washington, Gales & Seaton 1860). Porter published this document as a 
pamphlet in spring 1825. See Commodore Porter’s Defence, NILES’ WKLY. REG. (Baltimore, 
Md.), June 11, 1825, at 231.
277. PORTER PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 54 (testimony of Alexander Dallas).
278. Letter from Commodore Porter to Sec’y of the Navy (April 16, 1823), in PORTER 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 204.
279. Letter from Commodore Porter to Sec’y of the Navy (May 10, 1823), in PORTER 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 206.
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uapa, Cuba, “we pursued them [the pirates], and, after a short action, suc-
ceeded in taking both vessels, and effecting the almost total destruction of 
their crews, amounting, as nearly as could be ascertained at the time, to 50 
or 60 men; but, as we are since informed, to seventy or eighty.”280 The Por-
ter court of inquiry later praised this “gallant action, peculiarly destructive 
to the pirates.”281 Prisoners were taken, too. Some were delivered to Spanish 
authorities,282 some returned to the United States for criminal trial,283 and 
some were reportedly given to the British Navy’s anti-piracy squadron for 
summary execution.284
In June 1823, USN Lt. Thomas Newell wrote a report to his superiors 
lamenting that his efforts to kill pirates on a Cuban shore with grapeshot and 
canister from his vessel’s long gun were unsuccessful: “as for killing any of 
them, it was impossible, for, on the approach of the ‘Ferret’ [the navy 
schooner he commanded] they [the pirates] would completely secure them-
selves behind rocks and trees.”285 A bit later, a U.S. officer wrote to his su-
perior, Porter, noting a “brilliant achievement.”286 He reported to Porter that 
the Navy attacked pirate vessels at sea near Matanzas, Cuba, and “com-
menced a destructive slaughter, killing them in the water and as they landed; 
so exasperated were our men, that it was impossible for their officers to re-
strain them, and many [pirates] were killed after orders were given to grant 
quarters. Twenty-seven dead were counted.”287 This letter especially—even 
more than the other reports previously cited—is inconsistent with any no-
tion that due process of law was applicable. At the end of 1823, fully aware 
of incidents like the above because of reports to Washington from naval of-
280. Letter from Lt. Commandant Watson to Commodore Porter (May 21, 1823), in 
PORTER PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 302.
281. PORTER PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 91.
282. See Letter from Lt. Francis H. Gregory to Sec’y of the Navy (n.d.), in PORTER 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 143 (noting that the U.S. Navy placed 76 captured pirates 
“safely lodged in jail, committed for piracy” in Cuba).
283. See, e.g., United States v. Cartacho, 25 F. Cas. 312 (C.C.D. Va. 1823) (No. 14,738). 
Manuel Cartacho was captured by Lt. Stribling of Porter’s West Indies squadron and sailed 
into Norfolk, Virginia, to stand trial. See Norfolk, June 30, RICHMOND ENQUIRER, July 4, 
1823, at 2.
284. See KENNETH J. HAGAN, THIS PEOPLE’S NAVY: THE MAKING OF AMERICAN SEA 
POWER 97 (1991). I have not been able to verify this claim by Hagan. If true, it seems to sug-
gest a consciousness that summary execution of captured pirates by American officials would 
be wrongful.
285. BRADLEE, supra note 261, at 16; PORTER PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 282–
83.
286. Destruction of Pirates, EASTON GAZETTE (Easton, Md.), Aug. 2, 1823, at 3.
287. Id; see also News, NEW-HAMPSHIRE SENTINEL (Keene, N.H.), Aug. 22, 1823, at 3 
(reporting that the U.S. Navy engaged two pirate vessels, and “[t]he number of the pirates is 
stated at [from] 60 to 80, who, with the exception of nine, were either killed by our men, or 
drowned in attempting to swim on shore. Five were desperately wounded and taken prisoners, 
and have been sent by Com. Porter to the Gov. of Cuba for trial.”).
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ficers of the West Indies Squadron, the Secretary of the Navy instructed 
Porter to “continue your exertions to repress piracy, and protect our com-
merce.”288 Porter’s year-end report to the Secretary recounted that he burnt 
or otherwise destroyed all piratical vessels and land bases he encountered, 
and while “[s]ome severity has been exercised while the battle lasted . . . the 
result has been beneficial.”289
The West Indies squadron was back in U.S. waters for part of 1824,
during which time Congress and the executive considered whether to block-
ade Puerto Rico or Cuba for anti-piracy purposes. No agreement could be 
reached.290
The year 1825 started with statements by Congress and President Mon-
roe that are inconsistent with the due process thesis. The House Committee 
on Naval Affairs released a report hoping that local officials in Puerto Rico 
and Cuba will join “in earnest in the extirpation” of pirates, “these foes of 
the human race.”291 The president, meanwhile, sent a message to Congress 
requesting legislative authorization to engage in “reprisal on the private 
property” of the inhabitants of Spanish islands that harbor pirates. To be 
clear, the president was suggesting that the United States take or destroy the 
private property of Spaniards—subjects of a country at peace with the Unit-
ed States—whose only offense was to reside on islands where pirates were 
harbored by some in their community.292 This should have been seen as fla-
grantly illegal if a global due process view was held by anyone at that time.
Down in the Caribbean, in early spring 1825, the Navy attacked a “pi-
ratical sloop” and killed two or three pirates near Puerto Rico.293 A bit later, 
a naval officer reported to the Secretary of the Navy that they pursued a 
suspected pirate vessel, “an action commenced,” and two pirates were killed 
and five or six wounded, with those escaping to shore in Puerto Rico being 
288. ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER:
THE ORIGINS 372 (1976).
289. Letter from Commodore Porter to Sec’y of the Navy (Nov. 19, 1823), in PORTER 
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 214.
290. SOFAER, supra note 288, at 372–73.
291. Additional Naval Force for the Suppression of Piracy, in 1 AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS 1050 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., Washington, Gale 
& Seaton 1834). Congress also reiterated its two-pronged strategy of military violence and 
criminal prosecution. See H. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, PIRACY AND OUTRAGE ON THE 
COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES BY SPANISH PRIVATEERS, H.R. REP. NO. 18-398 (2d 
Sess. 1825), reprinted in 5 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253,
at 585 (noting that the United States was pursuing pirates in the Caribbean “by a vigorous ex-
ertion of the naval power” and “careful prosecution before competent tribunals of all the ac-
cused who were taken”).
292. President James Monroe, Address to the Senate of the United States (Jan. 13, 
1825), in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 490.
293. Piracy, N.Y. SPECTATOR, Apr. 19, 1825, at 3; see also Domestic, PORTLAND 
ADVERTISER (Portland, Me.), Apr. 6, 1825, at 2 (noting that the U.S. Navy engaged pirates 
off Puerto Rico and “5 of the pirates were killed”).
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caught by Spanish soldiers.294 Porter’s June 1825 orders to a subordinate 
cruising off Cuba reveal a lack of concern with orderly legal process:
You will protect the honest and peaceable inhabitants, but whenev-
er you find fishermen without their families, you will give them a 
rigid examination, and if you find them without license and with 
arms, you will destroy their establishment, and if there is good and 
sufficient reasons to believe that they have been engaged in acts of 
piracy, you will bring them off with you or deliver them to a Span-
ish civil or military officer.295
As noted above, Porter was recalled later in 1825 after offending Span-
ish authorities in Puerto Rico. By then, his work was mostly complete. 
There did continue to be some piracy and some U.S. naval actions in the 
West Indies, but both were far less frequent. In 1828, suspected pirates fired 
on U.S. naval vessels cruising the coast of Cuba. The Navy “discharged 
several broadsides” and then landed on shore, burned “[a] small hamlet, the 
pirates resided in,” and “many [pirates] were supposed to have been killed 
from the fire of the [schooners] as well as from the men who landed.”296
In sum, the Navy openly discussed exterminating pirates and destroying 
private property, without any semblance of concern about due process 
rights.
C. Views in Congress on the Extrajudicial Killing of Pirates
A number of congressional debates in the early nineteenth century re-
veal that many members of Congress agreed with the legal commentators 
and the position evidenced by executive branch practice that pirates encoun-
tered on the high seas could be killed without judicial process. Chapman’s
sole piece of evidence that states directly—according to his reading of it—
that U.S. constitutional rights required trial at common law for any pirates 
seized anywhere in the world by U.S. officials is a congressional document, 
a March 1822 report of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Naval 
Affairs.297 As discussed below, Chapman’s reading of the report is almost 
certainly erroneous.
1. Acrimony about Andrew Jackson’s Seminole War
In 1818, General Andrew Jackson led a small army—made up of U.S. 
regulars, volunteers from Tennessee, and friendly Native American Indi-
ans—into Spanish-owned Florida. Notwithstanding a state of peace with 
Spain, Jackson was authorized to do this by the Monroe administration in 
294. Official Papers, BERKSHIRE STAR (Stockbridge, Mass.), May 5, 1825, at 2.
295. PORTER PROCEEDINGS, supra note 275, at 298.
296. Defeat of Pirates, E. FLA. HERALD (St. Augustine), Sept. 13, 1828.
297. Chapman, supra note 15, at 420–21, 437.
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order to punish hostile Seminole Indians and runaway slaves who were us-
ing Florida as a haven for cross-border attacks.298 Jackson quickly exceeded 
his orders by attacking and ousting Spanish authorities and, after hunting 
down his prey, ordering the execution of two British subjects who were al-
lied with the Seminoles.299 The executions came after highly irregular and 
perfunctory military trials.
Jackson was a national figure of growing appeal. A partisan debate en-
sued in Congress about the propriety of his actions. Regarding the execu-
tions, Jackson justified himself by saying, among other things, “It is an es-
tablished principle of the law of nations, that any individual of a nation, 
making war against the citizens of another nation, they being at peace, for-
feits his allegiance, and becomes an outlaw and a pirate.”300 Jackson also 
contended that domestic U.S. law had nothing to say about the legality of 
the executions because they occurred in foreign territory.301
Congressional responses to his claims reveal something about attitudes 
toward execution of pirates encountered on the high seas. A report of the 
House Committee on Military Affairs did not deny that pirates might be 
summarily executed, but denied that the two British subjects should be con-
sidered to have the status of pirates.302 A report of a Select Senate Commit-
tee did the same.303 Henry Clay of Kentucky made ambiguous remarks in 
the House that perhaps asserted that the British subjects were denied consti-
tutional rights; Clay unambiguously declared that if the men were pirates 
they “should have been turned over to the civil authority,” and that execu-
tion could only follow condemnation in a court of competent jurisdiction.304
Jackson’s supporters disagreed. Henry Baldwin of Pennsylvania, later ap-
pointed to the U.S. Supreme Court, denied that the Constitution applied out-
side U.S. borders and sustained the legality of the executions, stating that 
the men were pirates and outlaws and thus “placed beyond the protection of 
civilized society.”305 Representative Johnson of Kentucky argued that, “by
analogy,” the British men “may be treated as pirates, and put to the 
sword.”306 Alexander Smyth of Virginia contended that “banditti” and pi-
rates could be lawfully killed, and that these men were properly treated as 
298. See Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 531–32.
299. Id. at 532.
300. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 516–17 (1819).
301. 34 ANNALS OF CONG. 2308, 2319 (1819) (Memorial from Major General Andrew 
Jackson to the Senate).
302. 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 517 (1819).
303. Id. at 267.
304. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 641–45. On the ambiguity in Clay’s comments and the re-
porting of them, see Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 533.
305. Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 526; 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 1042–44
(1819).
306. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 655 (1819).
440 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:385
such.307 He also disagreed with Clay on extraterritoriality, asserting that the 
U.S. Constitution and laws were not in force in Spanish Florida.308 George 
Strother and Philip Pendleton Barbour, both of Virginia, agreed that U.S. 
domestic law did not govern these events in foreign territory.309
2. Debates about Caribbean Piracy
In December 1822, Representative Lewis Condict of New Jersey intro-
duced a resolution asking that the Committee on Naval Affairs investigate 
and report on what measures are necessary “not only for the more efficient 
protection of our commerce in the West India seas from piracy, but for the 
entire extirpation of those freebooters, and the punishment of those who 
may be found to aid and abet them.”310 Condict stated:
I have no idea of incurring the delay, or the hazard, of transporting 
them here, or of extending them a trial by jury, with all the delays 
incident to our courts of justice. They have placed themselves be-
yond the protection of the laws of civilized society; they have set at 
open defiance the laws of God and man; their hand is against every 
man, and every man’s hand should combine against them. And the 
most effectual restraint which you can impose upon their barbari-
ties, is to furnish to them the spectacle of a few dozen of their lead-
ers suspending by the halter, from the yard-arms of some of our 
public ships.311
A bill was pending to authorize the president to purchase or construct 
vessels “for the purpose of repressing piracy, and of affording effectual pro-
tection to the citizens and commerce of the United States in the Gulf of 
Mexico, and the seas and territories adjacent.”312 Representative Taylor of 
New York wanted that bill to pass immediately so the executive could 
“promptly organize a force adequate to their [the pirates’] total extermina-
tion.”313 Alexander Smyth of Virginia then introduced an amendment “[t]hat 
the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and required, to pursue the pi-
rates by land on any of the West India islands to which they may resort, as 
well as on the ocean, until they are exterminated.”314 This proposal implies, 
of course, that military extermination of pirates is lawful.
307. Id. at 684–86.
308. Id. at 692–94; 32 ANNALS OF CONG. 693 (1819).
309. 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 845–46 (statements of Rep. Strother); 32 ANNALS OF CONG.
778 (1819) (statements of Rep. Barbour).
310. 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 348 (1822).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 371.
313. Id. at 374.
314. Id. at 377.
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Louis McLane of Delaware—a former Navy midshipman and now 
chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs—objected to the proposed 
amendment because, by the law of nations, no nation can enter another’s
territory to pursue pirates unless that nation was unable or unwilling to pre-
vent the piracies.315 This was a concern about state sovereignty, not individ-
ual rights. Churchill Cambreleng, a merchant from New York and another 
Naval Committee member, opposed the amendment because he hoped the 
executive would pursue pirates across any “imaginary line” marking Span-
ish territory and thought that Congress should be willing to accept war if 
that was what resulted from necessary U.S. actions against pirates.316 Thus,
Cambreleng supported a military extermination of pirates.
Additional evidence of his lack of belief that the Due Process Clause 
required that all pirates be handled through a domestic criminal justice pro-
cess is found in Cambreleng’s subsequent statement. He declared that he 
supported the pending bill to use the military because, when pirates have 
previously been captured, “they make their escape from a just fate through 
the sinuosities of the law.”317 Philip Pendleton Barbour of Virginia, recently 
elected to be the Speaker of the House, spoke up to oppose the Smyth 
amendment because of concerns about violations of the law of nations if 
Congress authorized its naval forces to enter another country’s territory. He
also referenced concerns about interfering with the president’s discretion to 
act as Commander-in-Chief.318 The Speaker saw no legal impediment to ex-
tralegal summary punishment of pirates:
With regard to the idea of pirates being the enemies of human race, 
there could be no doubt of it, and on the great highway of nations 
[the high seas] we have a right to take them and deal with them as 
we please. But it was another question how far we have a right to 
pursue them on the territory of another and a friendly Power.319
No one is recorded expressing disagreement with the legal views of 
Johnston, Condict, Smyth, Cambreleng, or Barbour about military extermi-
nation of pirates. After three other representatives expressed concerns about 
the Smyth amendment on Spanish sovereignty grounds and two representa-
tives suggested that an important bill to bolster the naval force against pira-
cy should not be sidelined because of debatable questions about the law of 
nations, Smyth withdrew his amendment and the bill passed.320
315. Id. at 377–78; see generally BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS 1774–
PRESENT, http://bioguide.congress.gov (last visited Oct. 4, 2018) (providing biographies of 
members of Congress).
316. 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 379 (1822).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 380.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 382–84.
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In a brief Senate discussion, Senator James Barbour, brother of the 
Speaker of the House, referenced the House debates and stated that the 
United States can pursue pirates into a neutral country, and that all nations 
would “rejoice” in the “extermination” of pirates, who “deserved death at 
every man’s hand, and whom it was just and proper to exterminate 
wheresoever they could be found.”321 As in the House, there was no disa-
greement with this legal position.
3. The Report of the House Committee on Naval Affairs
Chapman’s sole piece of evidence—according to his reading of it—that 
states directly that U.S. constitutional rights required trial at common law 
for any pirates seized anywhere in the world by U.S. officials is a March 
1822 report of the House of Representatives’ Committee on Naval Af-
fairs.322 This is the relevant section of the report, which was issued a few 
months before the House debate recounted above:
The committee are also of the opinion that it would be inexpedient 
‘to authorize the destruction of persons and vessels found at sea, or 
in uninhabited places, making war upon the commerce of the Unit-
ed States without any regular commission,’ and that it would be in-
consistent with public law or general usage to give any authority to 
destroy pirates and piratical vessels found at sea or in uninhabited 
places. The committee are of the opinion that it would be danger-
ous, and productive of great evil, to vest in the commanders of our 
public vessels an authority to treat as pirates, and punish without 
trial, even such persons as above described. It is not necessary for 
the accomplishment of the object in view that such an authority 
should be given, and it is essentially due to the rights of all, and the 
principles of ‘public law and general usage,’ that the consequences 
and punishment of piracy should follow only a legal adjudication of 
the fact.323
The reasons given by the Committee for recommending against such 
legislation sound primarily in policy, not law: “inexpedient,” “not neces-
sary,” and, “dangerous.” But Chapman reads the document as expressing 
the view that law and, specifically, due process of law under the Constitu-
tion, required that any alleged pirate confronted by U.S. officials be tried 
according to ordinary domestic law enforcement procedures.324 He concedes 
that “general usage” “almost certainly referred exclusively to the practices 
321. Id. at 34.
322. Chapman, supra note 15, at 420–21, 437.
323. Additional Number of Small Vessels to be Employed for the Suppression of Piracy: 
Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on Naval Affairs, 17th Cong., 1st Sess. (1822), reprinted in 1
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS, supra note 291, at 787, 788.
324. Chapman, supra note 15, at 420–21, 437.
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of other nations,” but asserts that the term “public law” “could have been 
understood” to mean the Constitution.325 Chapman also states, “[i]t is un-
clear where the request originated, but it may well have been the Executive 
Department.”326
The request originated with Representative Josiah Stoddard Johnston of 
Louisiana, a lawyer and judge who represented a state containing a signifi-
cant port (New Orleans), which handled a large oceanic trade. In February 
1822, Johnston introduced a motioned that:
[T]he Committee on Naval Affairs were instructed to inquire into 
the expediency of employing a greater number of public vessels in 
the suppression of the piracies carried on against the commerce of 
the United States, and whether it is necessary to employ, arm, and 
equip, private vessels for this purpose, and how many, and in what 
manner; and to report, generally, the measures deemed necessary to 
give entire and effectual protection to the persons and property of 
the citizens of the United States in the West Indies and Gulf of 
Mexico; and to inquire how far it may be expedient to authorize the 
destruction of persons and vessels found at sea, or in uninhabited 
places, making war upon the commerce of the United States with-
out any regular commission; and how far, consistent with public 
law, a general usage or authority may be given to destroy pirates 
and piratical vessels found at sea or in uninhabited places.327
By suggesting that whether to adopt this policy was a matter of expedi-
ency and, as we shall see, perhaps international law, Johnston was taking an 
implicit legal position that the Constitution did not prohibit summary, extra-
judicial killing of suspected pirates and destruction of their property.
The Committee that took up his resolution and prepared the report 
quoted above was chaired by Louis McLane, the lawyer and former Navy 
man.328 Other committee members also had experience with law and mari-
time matters, including Timothy Fuller, a Martha’s Vineyard lawyer; Ben-
jamin Hardin, a Kentucky lawyer who frequently appeared before the U.S. 
Supreme Court; George Gilmer, a Georgia lawyer; and Cambreleng, the 
New York merchant.329
In speaking of piracy on the high seas in the context of relations with 
Spain and its former colonies, now claiming to be independent states, what 
would men learned in law, government, and maritime affairs mean by the 
terms “public law and general usage”? There can be little doubt that the 
325. Id. at 420.
326. Id.
327. 38 ANNALS OF CONG. 911 (1822).
328. Id. at 1014–15.
329. See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONGRESS 1774–PRESENT, http://
bioguide.congress.gov (last visited Oct. 4, 2018).
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committee was referring to international law. Only a few years before the 
Committee on Naval Affairs wrote its report, Justice Joseph Story, a mari-
time law expert, wrote the opinion in a major Supreme Court decision con-
cerning piracy called United States v. Smith. There, Story wrote that the 
rules of the law of nations concerning piracy “may be ascertained by con-
sulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or by 
the general usage and practice of nations[.]”330 House committee members 
would almost certainly have been familiar with this decision.
As noted, Chapman does concede that “general usage” in the context of 
the committee report must refer to the practices of nations. In the context of 
this House document, “public law,” especially when referenced together 
with the practices of nations, clearly refers to international law. In addition 
to Smith, numerous contemporaneous federal court decisions, important le-
gal treatises and pamphlets, and debates in Congress can be cited to show 
that “public law” meant international law when used, as here, in the context 
of maritime affairs and/or relations with other nations.331
In case this evidence of linguistic usage is not enough to persuade, the 
nearly-contemporaneous congressional debate about piracy recounted 
above332 shows that members of the Naval Committee and other members of 
Congress suggested without dissent that extrajudicial killing of pirates was 
lawful.
Insofar as the Committee report referenced law in addition to the prima-
ry concerns about policy and expediency, it was referring to international 
law. Chapman rejects that reading of the report because, he writes, “[i]t is 
doubtful” that the law of nations guaranteed legal adjudication for persons 
330. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160 (1820) (emphasis added).
331. See, e.g., Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 145–46 (1812); 
The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 418–19 (1815); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 
Wheat.) 283, 348–49 (1822); La Nereyda, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 108, 141, 148–49, 154–55
(1823); The Gran Para, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 471, 484 (1822); The Fortuna, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 
161, 166 (1817); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 103 (1825); The Julia, 12 U.S. (8 
Cranch) 181, 189 (1814); United States v. The La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551); Johnson v. Twenty-One Bales, 13 F. Cas. 855, 860–61, 863 
(C.C.D.N.Y. 1814) (No. 7,417); The Francis, 9 F. Cas. 673, 673–74 (C.C.D.R.I. 1813) (No. 
5,034), aff’d, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 363 (1814); United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653, 656 
(C.C.D. Pa. 1813) (No. 15,494); 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 643, 655–57, 669, 746–48, 769, 779, 
898, 939, 962–63, 971, 1093 (including statements on “public law” by Reps. Clay, Johnson, 
Barbour, Storrs, Mercer, Anderson, Poindexter, and Desha); CORNELIUS VAN 
BYNKERSHOEK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WAR, at vi, 70, 175 (Peter Stephen Du Ponceau 
trans., Philadelphia, Farrand & Nicholas 1810); HENRY WHEATON, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF 
MARITIME CAPTURES AND PRIZES, at iii, vii, 54, 94, 96, 171, 209, 214, 260 (New York, 
M’Dermut & D.D. Arden 1815); KENT, supra note 244, at 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 21, 38, 
39, 71, 78, 115, 144, 175, 182, 194; JAMES MADISON, AN EXAMINATION OF THE BRITISH 
DOCTRINE, WHICH SUBJECTS TO CAPTURE A NEUTRAL TRADE, NOT OPEN IN TIME OF PEACE
27, 46, 47, 85, 104 n.†, 154, 188 (Philadelphia, 1805).
332. See infra Section VI.C.2.
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captured abroad suspected of piracy.333 But Chapman is ignoring an im-
portant part of international law—treaties.
Recall that the context in which the Committee report was written was 
how to address pirates based on Spanish islands, primarily Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. And the United States had recently, in 1819, reaffirmed the core pro-
visions of a 1795 treaty with Spain.334 One of the reaffirmed 1795 provisions 
stated:
[T]hat the Subjects or Citizens of each of the contracting Parties, 
their Vessels, or effects shall not be liable to . . . detention on the 
part of the other for any military expedition or other public or pri-
vate purpose whatever; and in all cases of seizure, detention, or ar-
rest for . . . offences commited by any Citizen or Subject of the one 
Party within the jurisdiction of the other, the same shall be made 
and prosecuted by order and authority of law only, and according to 
the regular course of proceedings usual in such cases.335
The reaffirmed treaty also provided:
[T]hat the inhabitants of the territories of each Party shall respec-
tively have free access to the Courts of Justice of the other, and 
they shall be permitted to prosecute suits for the recovery of their 
properties . . . and for obtaining satisfaction for the damages which 
they may have sustained.336
These treaty provisions were an important part of the “public law” that gov-
erned relations between Spain and the United States at the time. Whether or 
not a strict reading of their terms makes them applicable to seizures of pi-
rates of Spanish nationality on the high seas,337 the Committee would cer-
tainly have been aware that Spanish-United States relations on these matters 
were fraught and that erring on the side of legal process was good policy.
In addition, the United States promised Spain in the 1795 treaty, and re-
affirmed in 1819, that it would criminally “punish[ ] as a Pirate” any Span-
ish subject or U.S. citizen who sailed under a letter of marque or other 
commerce-raiding commission of a country at war with Spain.338 As noted 
333. Chapman, supra note 15, at 420; see also Chapman, supra note 15, at 434–36 (fur-
ther arguing that the law of nations did not require any particular municipal arrangement for 
trying piracy, such as a jury trial).
334. Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, supra note 260. (“The treaty of limits and 
navigation, of 1795, remains confirmed in all and each one of its articles excepting the 2, 3, 4, 
21, and the second clause of the 22d article.”). The treaty went into effect in early 1821.
335. Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation, U.S.-Spain, art. 7, Oct. 27, 1795, 8 
Stat. 138.
336. Id. art. 20.
337. I think it is possible that the first quoted provision would not be, but the second 
would.
338. Id. art. 14.
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above, many of the pirates in the Caribbean tried to legally justify their ac-
tivities by means of real or feigned privateering commissions from breaka-
way Spanish colonies that were fighting for their independence. This third 
provision supplies yet another reason why the House Committee might 
write that the “public law” governing its relations with Spain concerning pi-
racy should prioritize the use of law enforcement methods over brute force.
Other international law binding on the United States also counseled in 
favor of law enforcement methods when dealing with suspected pirates in 
the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico. France and Great Britain both had many 
colonial possessions in that area, where the United States was acting against 
pirates, and thus had many subjects who made a living on the seas there, ei-
ther legally or illegally. Bilateral treaties between the United States, on the 
one hand, and both Britain and France on the other, promised that each 
country would refuse to harbor or aid any pirates and would bring pirates to 
“condign punishment,”339 almost certainly referring to a criminal convic-
tion.340 Only by ignoring these treaties can it be said that the House Commit-
tee on Naval Affairs had no reason to suggest that “public law” favored law 
enforcement methods rather than summary execution of pirates captured in 
the West Indies.
* * *
Americans operating under their new Constitution continued to follow 
the essentials of English law and practice with regard to piracy. Criminal 
trials were used frequently for captured pirates. But the government also 
frequently engaged in extrajudicial killing of pirates, as well as destruction 
of their property. Members of Congress expressly argued that this was law-
ful. The only evidence Chapman presents suggesting directly that the Con-
stitution required law enforcement methods for any pirates encountered an-
ywhere in the world—the 1822 House committee report—is best read as 
saying no such thing.
IV.  The War-Law Enforcement Divide
An enduring problem—one that is particularly acute with the United 
States’ post-9/11 responses to international terrorism—is to distinguish situ-
ations in which the government may lawfully use military force against le-
339. Convention of 1800, U.S.-Fr., art. 26, Sept. 30, 1800, 8 Stat 178; see Treaty of Am-
ity, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 20, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116 [hereinafter 
Jay Treaty].
340. This provision was present in another U.S. treaty, in a context in which it is clear 
that criminal punishment is meant. Jay Treaty, supra note 339 (“[T]he said Contracting Par-
ties, shall not only refuse to receive any Pirates into any of their Ports, Havens, or Towns, or 
permit any of their inhabitants to receive, protect, harbour, conceal or assist them in any man-
ner, but will bring to condign punishment all such Inhabitants as shall be guilty of such acts or 
offences.”).
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thal non-state actors, instead of the default methods of ordinary law en-
forcement. The polar cases are clear. In state-to-state armed conflict, mili-
tary force can lawfully be used and enemy combatants lack individual rights 
under domestic law, such as the Constitution. To address ordinary domestic 
crime committed by single persons or small groups, the criminal justice ap-
proach, with its attendant procedural protections, is mandatory. Piracy, 
which, like international terrorism, threatens mass-casualty attacks, trans-
cends these neat polar categories and hence requires difficult line-drawing. 
The legal stakes are high: full due process or none.
Chapman, by contrast, seems to view the line-drawing problem as rela-
tively straightforward. “[W]ar was an exceptional legal state. Americans 
understood that enemies were different than those suspected of violating 
municipal (i.e., domestic) law.”341 And further: “Americans understood all 
those suspected of violating U.S. law—anywhere—to be entitled to due 
process of law.”342 In other words, if individuals or groups of individuals 
were “suspected” of engaging in conduct that violated U.S. criminal or civil 
laws, then only the ordinary means of law enforcement, comporting with 
ordinary constitutional norms, could be used in response. And Chapman 
claims that the U.S. government and other actors “consistently distin-
guished” between law enforcement settings in which due process was appli-
cable and “war,”343 but provides no examples that expressly show this sup-
posed distinction being made.
In fact, this supposedly bright-line rule was never the law in the United 
States. Within the United States, the constitutional tradition has always been 
to zealously guard citizens from military force. Fear of standing armies that 
would oppress the citizenry was one of the Anti-Federalists’ most potent ar-
guments against the proposed constitution.344 But some types of law-
breaking and violence were too widespread and powerful to be handled 
solely by courts, juries, law enforcement, and due process. And outside the 
country, the clear lines that Chapman sees in domestic law have always 
been blurry, allowing the government great leeway to choose how it will re-
spond to security threats.
The Constitution authorizes the suspension of habeas corpus—the sus-
pension of judicial due process—”when in cases of rebellion or invasion the 
341. Chapman, supra note 15, at 383.
342. Id. at 389.
343. Id. at 413, 426–27.
344. See, e.g., 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 164 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) 
(statement by Pennsylvania minority) (“A standing army . . . may be made a fatal instrument 
to overturn the public liberties; it may be employed to enforce the collection of the most op-
pressive taxes, and to carry into execution the most arbitrary measures. An ambitious man 
who may have the army at his devotion, may step up into the throne, and seize upon absolute 
power.”); 3 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 375 (Brutus II, New York Journal, Nov. 1, 
1787) (“[A]s standing armies in time of peace are dangerous, they are not to be kept up.”).
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public safety may require it.”345 Likewise, the Constitution allows Congress 
to call forth the militia “to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrec-
tions and repel invasions.”346 But these authorizations and limitations appear 
by their text to apply only domestically—insurrections, rebellions, and inva-
sions are events that happen within a country, not outside of it.347 The Con-
stitution did not provide protections against martial law outside the United 
States.
When widespread resistance to U.S. laws occurred within the country, 
Congress had already carefully hemmed in the president’s ability to respond 
with military force. The 1792 Militia Act (or Calling Forth Act), followed 
scrupulously by President Washington to put down the Whiskey Rebellion 
of 1794, required that: the state where the armed resistance was occurring 
petition for federal assistance; a federal judge certify that “the laws of the 
United States [had been] opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed, in 
any state, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary 
course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by 
this act;” and the president, “by proclamation, “ “command such insurgents 
to disperse, and retire peaceably to their respective abodes, within a limited 
time.”348 Even so, ordinary military could not be used, only militia from the 
state where the disturbance was occurring, unless other formalities were 
met.349 These extensive safeguards were required domestically—the act ap-
plied only in “any state”350—before the U.S. executive could move to a mili-
tary or “war” paradigm to address mass law-breaking. That domestic re-
striction on the reach of the statute was not accidental, but rather reflective 
of the view that fundamental rights restricted the U.S. government domesti-
cally when proceeding against people who were wholly or primarily citi-
zens.
There was no corresponding statutory framework, or even informal tra-
dition, with similar safeguards for extraterritorial uses of the military against 
345. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
346. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
347. See Kent, Global Constitution, supra note 7, at 522–23. But see Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that the Habeas Suspension Clause “has full effect”
at a U.S. military base in territory permanently leased from Cuba).
348. Militia Act of 1792, ch. 23, §§ 1–3, 1 Stat. 264. (amended 1795). As I and a co-
author have elsewhere written, “[t]he intricacy of these checks was no accident. The proposal 
to allow the president to call out the militia to execute federal law was controversial and much 
debated. It passed only after the initial bill was amended to add precisely the procedural 
checks that [President] Washington later followed so carefully.” Andrew Kent & Julian Davis 
Mortenson, Executive Power and National Security Power, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 261, 265 n.13 (Karen Orren & John W. Compton 
eds., 2018).
349. Militia Act of 1792, ch. 23, § 2, 1 Stat. 264. (amended 1795).
350. Id. When the 1792 Act expired via its sunset provision, Congress re-enacted it in 
essentially the same form in 1795. See Militia Act of 1795, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424. (amended 
1862).
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groups that violated U.S. laws. Instead, American law and policy adopted a 
hybrid approach: both criminal justice measures and military force could be 
used against dangerous non-state actors, where considered appropriate by 
the executive, assuming that Congress authorized use of military force cov-
ered by its prerogative to declare war.
The Articles of Confederation evidence the hybridity of piracy and the 
flexibility the government had in determining how to respond. On the one 
hand, the Articles gave the central government the power of “appointing 
courts for the trial of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas.”351
On the other, the Articles distinctly contemplated military force being used 
to suppress piracy, in the provision barring states from commissioning “any 
ships or vessels of war,” except if war is waged under the authority of the 
central government or “unless such State be infested by pirates, in which 
case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion.”352 The fact that pi-
rates could be treated as military enemies is apparent in the frequently re-
peated tropes that pirates declared “war” against all mankind353 and were 
“hostis humani generi,” that is, military enemies of all mankind.354
We can see evidence of hybridity in the United States’ response to the 
“piratical establishment” at Amelia Island in Spanish Florida, discussed 
above.355 As noted above, the executive and Congress both announced that 
the gang there was engaged in violations of U.S. law, such as the laws 
against piracy and the international slave trade.356 For Chapman, this should 
mean that only law enforcement measures, consistent with constitutional 
due process, could be used. But the executive authorized a naval attack and, 
as noted above, no one was heard to complain that that was illegal.
Chapman responds that the Amelia Island incident is not evidence 
against his thesis because the armed group there was “quasi-sovereign.”357
Thus, “[f]rom the United States’ standpoint, the enterprise amounted to an 
exercise of war power because it entailed military action against a group
351. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX, para. 1.
352. Id. art. VI, para. 5.
353. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *71 (stating that the pirate “has reduced 
himself afresh to the savage state of nature, by declaring war against all mankind”);
JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS supra note 137, at 797 (John Jay, Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs, stating “Piracy is War against all mankind, which is the highest Violation of 
the Laws of Nations.”).
354. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 75, at *71 (quoting Coke).
355. See supra notes 253–259 and accompanying text.
356. H.R. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, SUPPRESSION OF PIRATICAL 
ESTABLISHMENTS, H.R. REP. NO. 15-290 (1st Sess. 1818), reprinted in AMERICAN STATE 
PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 132, 133; Message from President James 
Monroe to Congress (December 2, 1817), in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 130; Message from President James Monroe to Congress
(January 13, 1818), in AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 
139.
357. Chapman, supra note 15, at 428.
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with political pretensions.”358 He does not explain why an unrealistic—
actually absurd—pretension to international sovereignty on behalf of a 
small group of pirates and smugglers should determine the constitutionality 
of the United States’ responses to them. In any event, both President Mon-
roe and Congress agreed that the criminals at Amelia Island were non-state 
actors,359 yet nevertheless viewed naval attack on them as lawful.
Were this an isolated instance of the use of military force against non-
state actors who violated U.S. criminal laws, we might dismiss it as excep-
tional. But in fact, the whole course of the U.S. government response to pi-
racy in the Caribbean evidences the view that the government had the option 
of using either or both law enforcement and military force when confronting 
hybrid threats, outside a state of formal war.360 Thus, I have no found sup-
port in the historical record concerning piracy for Chapman’s claim that due 
process was understood to limit the United States to using judicial process 
and law enforcement methods to deal with all nonstate actors who violated 
U.S. criminal laws.
Conclusion
The great weight of the evidence refutes the claim that either English or 
early American law viewed due process in the sense claimed by Chapman. 
But this fact proves far less than some might fear. Although the law allowed 
the use of military force and summary executions against pirates, Anglo-
American practice was to use the criminal justice system extensively to try 
pirates captured on the high seas, according them full due process when do-
ing so. This preference for due process in many circumstances was driven 
by a mix of factors, including concerns sounding in domestic policy, inter-
national relations, fairness to the accused, and the desire to leave open the 
possibility of mercy. International law also granted rights to persons en-
countered by the U.S. and English governments on the high seas. So the 
choice should not be viewed as a stark one, between the global extension of 
due process and barbarism. The preference for criminal process was always 
present, but may well have grown over time. This could be evidence of the 
gradual development of a kind of due process-consciousness, even with re-
gard to persons outside national borders accused of heinous crimes. But I 
have found essentially no evidence for Chapman’s much stronger claim for 
an established understanding of global due process, first under the English 
common law and then under the original understanding of the U.S. Consti-
tution.
358. Id. (emphasis added).
359. See Message from President James Monroe to Congress (Jan. 13, 1818), in
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 253, at 139; 31 ANNALS OF 
CONG. 646–48 (1818).
360. See supra Section IV.B.
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Judicial oversight of extraterritorial security and foreign affairs actions 
via application of fundamental domestic law is not the only way to protect 
against abuse. In fact, until very recently, it played almost no role in either 
the British/English or U.S. traditions. Perhaps change is desirable; perhaps 
the U.S. Constitution should go global to protect noncitizens, even in hy-
brid, war-like contexts such as terrorism and piracy. But if that occurs, it 
should be because judges have accurately understood our legal history and 
decided affirmatively that change is desirable. Arguments for such a change 
in U.S. law should address whether extending constitutional protections 
would be consistent with the legitimate security needs of the United States, 
as well as with evolving norms of international and constitutional rights in 
related contexts. This contextual, incremental, policy-sensitive approach to 
developing legal change would be, in my view, preferable to sweeping 
originalist arguments that have little basis in our history, institutional prac-
tices, and legal traditions.
